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COMMENT 
PRUNING THE HEDGE: WHO IS A “CLIENT” AND 
WHOM DOES AN ADVISER ADVISE? 
Edward Pekarek∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Phillip Goldstein, government gadfly and a former New York City 
municipal employee,1 is now manager of a group of pooled investments 
that operates under the moniker “Bulldog Investors.”2  Mr. Goldstein3 
took the Securities and Exchange Commission to task in a successful 
challenge4 of the so-called “Hedge-Fund Rule.”5  The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit was apparently persuaded 
∗ The Author holds a Corporate, Banking and Finance LLM degree from Fordham 
University School of Law; J.D., Cleveland-Marshall College of Law; and a B.A., The 
College of Wooster.  The Author thanks Fordham University Adjunct Professors John 
F.X. Peloso and Barry W. Rashkover for their kind guidance and sage observations.  
The foregoing opinions, conclusions, and perhaps errors, are solely those of the Author, 
who can be contacted at mail@edpekarek.com. 
 1. See Jay Loomis, Activist Investing on the Rise, THE J. NEWS, Feb. 18, 2007, 
available at http://www.thejournalnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070218/ 
BUSINESS01/702180320/1066 (last visited Mar. 26, 2007) (“[Phillip Goldstein] 
previously worked 25 years as a civil engineer for New York City.”). 
 2. See generally http://www.bulldoginvestors.com/. 
 3. See, e.g., infra note 80. 
 4. See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 5. The respondent SEC apparently took umbrage with the Goldstein petitioners’ 
use of this phrase because it created some confusion that the Rule itself governed hedge 
funds, when in fact it acted as an oversight measure for investment advisers, rather than 
the funds under management.  See Goldstein v. SEC, 2005 WL 1636146, at *5 n.1 
(D.C. Cir. 2005) [hereinafter SEC’s Appell. Brief] (“[P]etitioners’ pervasive references 
to the ‘Hedge Fund Rule’ create a misleading impression.”).  Despite these comments 
by the SEC in brief, the Goldstein court adopted the phrase coined by the petitioners 
and used it throughout its opinion, including in its ruling statement.  Goldstein, 451 
F.3d at 884, 877, 880-81, 883-84 (“The petition for review is granted, and the Hedge 
Fund Rule is vacated and remanded.”) (emphasis added). 
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by the “Bulldog’s” theory, and vacated the entire investment adviser 
registration regime as “arbitrary.”6  The court of appeals largely based 
this decision upon the contextual meaning of the word “client,”7 and the 
prior use and interpretation of that term by the SEC.8
The “Bulldog’s” challenge of the investment adviser registration 
framework may prove to be among a handful of events responsible for 
the introduction of the phrase “hedge fund” into mainstream9 America’s 
lexicon and perhaps our collective culture.10  The resolution of the 
Goldstein matter now appears to be a temporary regulatory setback that 
might later be viewed as an instance of regulatory “creative destruction” 
that leads to meaningful regulatory reform.11  Perhaps the “Bulldog” 
chewing up the investment adviser registration regime also ushered in a 
new era of how we perceive these pooled investments and their 
respective roles in domestic capital markets, how they might be 
monitored by market regulators in the U.S. and abroad, and the 
substantive debate it fostered may later be recognized as the catalyst for 
a pragmatic regulatory reform of the hedge fund landscape. 
II. “BULLDOG” CHALLENGES SEC “CLIENT” COUNTING 
During its review of the so-called “Hedge Fund Rule” (the 
“Rule”)12 in the matter of Goldstein v. SEC,13 the U.S. Circuit Court of 
 6. Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 883. 
 7. Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 876 (citing 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-1 (“[T]he 
Commission has interpreted this provision to refer to the partnership or entity itself as 
the adviser’s ‘client.’”)). 
 8. See Part II, infra. 
 9. Even one of the most mainstream Internet sources, Wikipedia, now has a 
lengthy entry for “hedge funds.”  See, e.g., http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hedge_fund 
(last visited Apr. 4, 2007). 
 10. The creator and executive producer of the HBO series “Entourage,” Doug 
Ellin, is currently developing an untitled HBO comedy series based on the fictitious 
lives of hedge fund managers.  See Denise Martin, Boys’ night out at HBO, Ellin’s next 
comedy series set on Wall Street, VARIETY, Oct. 10, 2006, available at 
http://www.variety.com/article/VR1117951668.html?cs=1&s=h&p=0 (last visited April 
24, 2007); see also Andrew Ross Sorkin, Wall Street TV, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK, 
available at http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2006/10/18/wall-street-tv/ (last visited 
April 24, 2007). 
 11. Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, pp. 82-85 
(Harper, 1975) [orig. pub. 1942]. 
 12. See SEC’s Appell. Brief, 2005 WL 1636146, at *5. 
 13. 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
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Appeals for the District of Columbia addressed some of the key issues in 
the interpretive debate of the definition of the word “client” within the 
context of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the “Advisers Act”).14  
This Comment addresses some of those issues, including: (i) the current 
state of the hedge fund market sector, (ii) background related to the 
adoption of the Rule, (iii) the key challenges asserted by the Goldstein 
petitioners, (iv) interpretation of the term “client” as it relates to the 
“private fund adviser” exemption within the Advisers Act, and (v) the 
factual bases cited by the Respondent Securities and Exchange 
Commission (the “SEC” or the “Commission”) in support of the 
Commission’s promulgation of the Rule, and the resultant challenges 
raised by the Goldstein petitioners to those seemingly sound bases.  The 
“Bulldog” prevailed in his challenge of the Rule due in no small part to 
the SEC’s inconsistent interpretations of the term “client” over the years 
in various contexts. 
A. Is the Hedge Fund Sector an Overgrown Landscape? 
The term “hedge fund” has defied precise definition, and what 
started as a rather simple concept of pooling investment funds and 
utilizing strategies to insulate the pooled capital from significant market 
risk has evolved greatly in a half century.  Sociologist turned–journalist–
turned fund manager Alfred Winslow Jones15 coined the phrase “hedge 
fund” in 1949,16 less than a generation after the epic crash of the U.S. 
 
 14. The Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1 [hereinafter Advisers 
Act]. 
 15. David A. Vaughan, Partner, Dechert LLP, Comments for the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission Roundtable on Hedge Funds, May 14-15, 2003, Selected 
Definitions of “Hedge Fund” (citing Roger Lowenstein, When Genius Failed (2000)); 
Scott J. Lederman, Hedge Funds, FIN. PRODUCT FUNDAMENTALS: A GUIDE FOR 
LAWYERS 11-3, 11-4, 11-5 (Clifford E. Kirsch Ed., 2000); Carol Loomis, The Jones 
Nobody Keeps Up With, FORTUNE (Apr. 1966), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/hedgefunds/hedge-vaughn.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 
2007); see also Ted Gogoll, What’s Driving the Hedge Fund Boom?, 
BUSINESSWEEK.COM, Oct. 13, 2006, available at http://www.businessweek.com/ 
investor/content/oct2006/pi20061013_353103.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2006); see 
Goldstein v. SEC, No. 1:04CV02216, 2004 WL 3633837 (D.C. Cir. 2004) [hereinafter 
Goldstein Complaint]. 
 16. Stephen J. Brown, Keynote Address at the PACAP/FMA Meeting, Melbourne, 
Australia, July 7, 2000, Hedge Funds: Omniscient or Just Plain Wrong, NYU Stern 
School of Business (Mar. 9, 2001), available at http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~sbrown/ 
omniscient.pdf  (last visited Dec. 1, 2006). 
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stock market—the financial event widely considered to be the economic 
“tipping point” that ushered in the “Great Depression.”17  Jones’s term 
originally contemplated pooled investment portfolios18 composed of a 
combination of long and short equity positions,19 where the short sells 
presumably counter-balance long positions allowing for capital growth 
opportunities while insuring, or “hedging,” against any significant risk 
of loss, irrespective of the market’s direction.20
Today, Mr. Jones’s coined phrase better describes the legal 
management structures21 of investment pools22 rather than the 
 17. Stanley K. Schultz, Professor of History, American History 102: Civil War to 
the Present, Lecture 18 at the Univ. of Wis. (1999), available at 
http://us.history.wisc.edu/hist102/lectures/lecture18.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2006).  
In the fall of 1929, Yale University economist Irving Fisher confidently declared: “The 
nation is marching along a permanently high plateau of prosperity.”  Federal Reserve 
Bank of Dallas, Irving Fisher: Origins of Modern Central Bank Policy, ECON. 
INSIGHTS, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Dec. 6, 2006), available at http://www.dallasfed.org/ 
research/ei/ei0501.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2006).  Five days later (Oct. 29, 1929), on 
“Black Tuesday,” the U.S. stock market’s bottom dropped out and ushered in the Great 
Depression—the worst economic downturn in American history.  Id.  Mr. Fisher 
suffered huge losses in his personal portfolio (as well as in his reputation as an 
economist) after the 1929 crash and Great Depression, “eventually leaving an estate so 
small it wasn’t even taxed.”  Id. 
 18. During the mid-twentieth-century, pooled investment funds largely functioned 
at the fringes of the market.  Vaughan, supra note 15. 
 19. Id; see Brown, supra note 16. 
 20. See Brown, supra note 16; Goldstein Complaint, supra note 15, at ¶ 17. 
 21. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 876 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-
10, 80a-13); The Goldstein court recognized that: 
Another distinctive feature of hedge funds is their management structure.  Unlike 
mutual funds, which must comply with detailed requirements for independent boards 
of directors, and whose shareholders must explicitly approve of certain actions, 
domestic hedge funds are usually structured as limited partnerships to achieve 
maximum separation of ownership and management.  In the typical arrangement, the 
general partner manages the fund (or several funds) for a fixed fee and a percentage of 
the gross profits from the fund.  The limited partners are passive investors and 
generally take no part in management activities. 
Id. at 876 (internal citations omitted). 
 22. David Pilla, With Amaranth’s Implosion, Experts Eye Insurers’ Exposure to 
Hedge Fund Risks, BEST’S INV. NEWS (via Comtex News), Oct. 2, 2006.  Hedge fund 
structure has been a “tricky aspect” according to at least one legal pundit: 
One tricky aspect of hedge funds is that they generally are structured as limited 
partnerships, said [Nixon Peabody LLP investment partnership litigation specialist 
Tim] Mungovan.  An investor in a hedge fund is a limited partner – a very different 
arrangement from the shareholder in a mutual fund or stock.  “There are 75 years 
worth of accumulated corporate law on the duties that a company’s directors and 
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investment strategies employed.  Today’s hedge funds typically issue 
unregistered securities in “private offerings,” which, in general, are 
privately held by a restricted number of “accredited” investors,23 and 
which experienced record capital inflows of roughly $126.5 billon in 
2006.24  These pooled funds are typically either single or multiple 
strategy vehicles25 that employ an array of investment approaches 
officers owe to their shareholders,” he said.  “There is not anywhere near the history 
of laws and court cases involving limited partnerships.”  That means there is greater 
uncertainty about the rights, duties and obligations surrounding the limited 
partnership, he said. 
. . . 
So why are most hedge funds structured as limited partnerships?  “My personal 
opinion is that many of them have adopted the limited-partnership structure in part to 
avoid regulation by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission,” said 
Mungovan . . . .  The limited-partnership structure of hedge funds, along with their 
penchant for secrecy in terms of trading positions, means they shy away from such 
terms as “investment adviser,” said Mattessich.  Investment advisers generally are 
taken to be under the regulatory jurisdiction of the SEC. 
Id. 
 23. Securities and Exchange Commission Staff Hedge Fund Report Fact Sheet, 
Implications of the Growth of Hedge Funds, REPORT OF THE STAFF OF THE U.S. 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMISSION [sic], at 9-10, 61 (Sept. 2003) [hereinafter 2003 
SEC Staff Report], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf 
(last visited Dec. 1, 2006).  The term “accredited investor” was defined in 2006 to 
include: 
Individuals who have a net worth, or joint worth with their spouse, above $1,000,000, 
or have income above $200,000 in the last two years (or joint income with their 
spouse above $300,000) and a reasonable expectation of reaching the same income 
level in the year of investment; or are directors, officers or general partners of the 
hedge fund or its general partner; and 
Certain institutional investors, including: banks; savings and loan associations; 
registered brokers, dealers and investment companies; licensed small business 
investment companies; corporations, partnerships, limited liability companies and 
business trusts with more than $5,000,000 in assets; and many, if not most, employee 
benefit plans and trusts with more than $5,000,000 in assets. 
Id. at 15 (citing Rule 501(a) of Regulation D under The Securities Act of 1933). 
 24. See Aaron Seigel, Hedge Funds Rake in $126.5 billion, INV. NEWS, Jan. 17, 
2007, available at http://www.investmentnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070 
119/REG/70119027/0/FRONTPAGE (last visited Jan. 20, 2007) (“Hedge fund inflows 
for the quarter ended Dec. 31[, 2006] were $15.8 billion in a year that brought in a 
record $126.5 billion of hedge fund inflows, according to data released by Hedge Fund 
Research Inc. in Chicago.”); SEC, Hedging Your Bets: A Heads Up on Hedge Funds 
and Funds of Hedge Funds, available at http://www.sec.gov/answers/hedge.htm (last 
visited Nov 30, 2006). 
 25. See, e.g., Rolling In It, Why Investors Should Kick Up a Fuss About Hedge-
Fund Fees, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 16, 2006, available at 
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ostensibly designed to generate above-market returns, including the 
hedge fund adviser’s quest for the premium compensation known in the 
industry as “alpha.”26
The investment strategies utilized by hedge funds today are as 
diverse as the assets classes they hold.  Roughly nine-thousand hedge 
funds27 are currently in operation and control approximately two trillion 
dollars,28 reportedly five-percent of America’s total net worth.29  The 
http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=8173853 (last visited 
Feb. 18, 2007).  The strategies vary among hedge-funds, but: 
Hedge-fund managers are well aware of the limits of specializing [sic] in 
niche products.  Some simply close to new investors after reaching their 
target for funds under management.  But others want to keep growing. A 
number develop private-equity or banking characteristics, by providing 
capital directly to companies or making loans. Some are diversifying into 
multi-strategy funds, which invest across a range of sectors.  Others have 
started long-only funds, thereby opening up a much bigger market. As Peter 
Harrison of MPC investors, a fund manager, says: “There’s $1 trillion or so 
in hedge funds but $90 trillion of long-only money and that’s the big prize.” 
Id. 
 26. See Hedgeworld.com Glossary, available at http://www.hedgeworld.com 
/bottom_links/index.cgi?page=glossary (last visited Mar. 26, 2007) (“Alpha: A 
numerical value indicating a manager’s risk-adjusted excess rate of return relative to a 
benchmark. Measures a manager’s ‘value-added’ in selecting individual securities, 
independent of the effect of overall market movements.”); Raghuram G. Rajan, Benign 
Financial Conditions, Asset Management, and Political Risks: Trying to Make Sense of 
our Times, Oct 5-6, 2006, Speech at Conference on International Financial Instability: 
Cross-Border Banking and National Regulation Organized by the Federal Reserve Bank 
of Chicago, available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches /2006/100506.htm 
(last visited Mar. 26, 2007).  But see Steve Johnson, Replication is the New Buzzword, 
FIN. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 20138222 (last visited Dec. 1, 
2006); see also, Jeff Benjamin, Hedge funds embracing social mandate, INVESTMENT 
NEWS, June 25, 2007, available at http://www.investmentnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll 
/article?AID=/20070625 (last visited June 26, 2007).   Mr. Goldstein noting that the 
creation of “alpha” is a hedge fund’s raison d’etre, and adding a hint of what seems to 
suggest some sort of Machiavellian investing philosphy: 
“The function of a hedge fund is to create alpha, and anything that gets in the 
way of that is unwanted,” said Phillip Goldstein, a manager of Opportunity 
Partners LP, a hedge fund based in Pleasantville, N.Y.  “It sounds like a 
marketing gimmick, and I don’t know that any individuals would invest in 
something like that.” 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 27. See Rolling In It, supra note 25. 
 28. See Gogoll, supra note 15; see also Angela Ubide, Demystifying Hedge Funds, 
FINANCE & DEVELOPMENT (IMF Q. MAGAZINE), Vol. 43, No. 2, June 2006, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2006/06/basics.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 
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breadth of alternative asset classes held and strategy types employed by 
investment advisers are incredibly diverse.30  Hedge funds have also 
2007).  The International Monetary Fund (the “IMF”) reported: 
Currently, there are about 8,500 hedge funds operating worldwide, managing over $1 
trillion in assets.  Quite a leap from the 2,800 hedge funds, managing $2.8 billion in 
assets in 1995, not to mention the amounts involved in the earliest hedge fund–type 
investments in the days of Aristotle. 
Id. 
 29. Power and Money – Rally for Regulation, Interview by Maria Bartiromo with 
Attorney Paul Roth, Columbia Law Prof. Jack Coffee, and CNBC correspondent 
Charlie Gasparino (CNBC television Broadcast Dec. 5, 2006). 
 30. See, e.g., Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 875-76 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing The 
Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-12(a)(1),(3), 80a-13(a)(2), 2003 
SEC Staff Report, supra note 23, at 33-43).  The restrictions on investment classes and 
transaction types that apply to “Investment Companies” (i.e., mutual funds) do not 
apply to unregulated hedge funds: 
The Investment Company Act places significant restrictions on the types of 
transactions registered investment companies may undertake.  Such companies are, 
for example, foreclosed from trading on margin or engaging in short sales and must 
secure shareholder approval to take on significant debt or invest in certain types of 
assets, such as real estate or commodities.  These transactions are all core elements of 
most hedge funds’ trading strategies. 
Id. (internal citations omitted); see Goldstein, 453 F.3d at 876 (citing 2003 SEC Staff 
Report, supra note 23): 
“Hedging” transactions, from which the term “hedge fund” developed, involve taking 
both long and short positions on debt and equity securities to reduce risk.  This is still 
the most frequently used hedge fund strategy, though there are many others.  Hedge 
funds trade in all sorts of assets, from traditional stocks, bonds, and currencies to more 
exotic financial derivatives and even non-financial assets. Hedge funds often use 
leverage to increase their returns. 
Another distinctive feature of hedge funds is their management structure.  Unlike 
mutual funds, which must comply with detailed requirements for independent boards 
of directors, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10, and whose shareholders must explicitly approve of 
certain actions, Id. § 80a-13, domestic hedge funds are usually structured as limited 
partnerships to achieve maximum separation of ownership and management.  In the 
typical arrangement, the general partner manages the fund (or several funds) for a 
fixed fee and a percentage of the gross profits from the fund.  The limited partners are 
passive investors and generally take no part in management activities. 
Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Emil W. Henry, Jr., Assistant Secretary for 
Financial Institutions, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Remarks Before the Exchequer Club, 
May 17, 2006, JS-4270, available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/js4270.htm 
(last visited Dec. 1, 2006).  Investment advisers have almost unlimited investment 
options available: 
For example, many like me believe hedge funds are not properly classified when 
labeled an “asset class.”  Hedge funds are not an asset class.  There is just too much 
dispersion of strategy, leverage, and exposure to codify the group as such. 
A hedge fund, by contrast, has virtually unlimited flexibility.  All strategies are on the 
table—long positions, short selling, leveraged holdings, equities, bonds, currencies, 
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grown recently at an almost viral-like rate,31 both in the number of 
active funds,32 and in terms of the staggering amount of assets currently 
under management.  Hedge fund securities trading dominates the daily 
volume of many of the world’s markets,33 and a significant portion of 
recent SEC enforcement attention has been dedicated to alleged trading 
abuses by these funds.34  In many respects, however, the domestic 
mutual fund industry still dwarfs the hedge fund sector and demands 
much of the SEC’s already overextended attention; yet some market 
derivatives, multiple industries, et cetera.  All of these approaches are available and 
widely utilized by the hedge fund community.  Because capital tends to gravitate to 
where it is least encumbered and restricted, and hence earns the highest risk-adjusted 
return, it is not surprising that capital migrated from traditional funds to hedge funds.  
Of course, like most things in life, one thing’s greatest strength can be its greatest 
weakness.  The great flexibility of the hedge fund structure also lends itself to conduct 
that can lead to trouble, the most common being outsized risk-taking, concentrated 
positions, and over-leveraging. 
Id.; see Ubide, supra note 28. 
Hedge funds may have an aura of exoticism and modernism, but their goals are as old 
as the art of investing itself. They seek a positive annual return (the higher the better), 
limited swings in value, and, above all else, capital preservation. They do so by using 
the best of what modern financial science can provide—rapid price discovery; 
massive mathematical and statistical processing; risk measurement and control 
techniques; and leverage and active trading in corporate equities, bonds, foreign 
exchange, futures, options, swaps, forwards, and other derivatives. 
Id.; see CNBC report, Power and Money, CNBC Correspondent Melissa Lee reported 
from the Alternative Asset Management Conference, Dana Point, Calif., Dec. 5, 2006.  
Hedge funds are now reportedly taking direct positions in such diverse alternative assets 
as infrastructure projects (e.g., bridges, toll roads, and oil-gas delivery pipelines, timber 
properties, and Napa Valley vineyards).  Id. 
 31. See Gogoll, supra note 15 (Hedge funds are expected to balloon to 11,700 with 
$1.7 trillion in assets by 2008, according to Van Hedge Fund Advisors). 
 32. Id.; see also Ubide, supra note 28. 
 33. Heather Timmons, A London Hedge Fund That Opts for Engineers, Not 
M.B.A.’s, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com 
/2006/08/18/business/worldbusiness/18man.html? ex=1313553600&en=b2 fee1b41c85 
af15&ei=5088 (last visited Mar. 26, 2007) (stating that hedge funds account for an 
“estimated half of all United States stock trades and a quarter of worldwide currency 
trades”). 
 34. Jesse Westbrook & Otis Bilodeau, U.S. Insider Trading Bill Takes Aim at 
Hedge Funds, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 23, 2006, available at 
www.iht.com/articles/2006/11/23/business/hedge.php (last visited Apr. 13, 2007) 
(“Lawsuits involving hedge funds made up 11 percent of the SEC’s insider trading 
cases in fiscal 2006, according to agency figures.  The SEC expects to file more cases 
against the industry alleging illegal trading in 2007, the commission’s enforcement 
director, Linda Thomsen, said at a securities conference last week.”). 
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commentators remain concerned that another market meltdown is 
imminent and see hedge funds as its likely catalyst.35
 35. Ambrose Evan-Pritchard, Economic Storm Brewing In America, LONDON 
TELEGRAPH, Dec. 7, 2006, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/ 
main.jhtml?xml=/opinion/2006/12/07/do0702.xml&sS (last visited Feb. 18, 2007).  
U.S. Treasury Secretary (and former Goldman-Sachs chief), Henry “Hank” Paulson 
publicly expressed some concern about the degree of economic influence that hedge 
funds represent, and their potential for systemic damage: 
The world economy is what matters, and I don’t like the smell of it. Nor, apparently, 
does Hank Paulson, who made $700 million at Goldman Sachs before taking over the 
U.S. Treasury this year.  He has reactivated a crisis team with a command centre [sic] 
in Washington to cope with the “systemic risk” in a market melt-down. His worry? 
8,000 unregulated hedge funds with $1.3 trillion at hand, and derivative contracts now 
worth $370 trillion.  “We need to be very careful here,” he said.  A well-sourced 
article in Washington’s Weekly Standard says Mr. Paulson fears a “serious crisis that 
would be a body-blow to the US economy.” 
Id; see SEC Commissioner Paul S. Atkins, Remarks Before the N.Y. City Bar Assoc. 
(May 5, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2006/spch050506psa.htm 
(last visited Dec. 2, 2006) [hereinafter Speech].  Commissioner Atkins has noted the 
“opportunity costs” the SEC encounters with hedge fund regulation: 
One of the issues that Commissioner Glassman and I raised when we dissented from 
the hedge fund rule was the opportunity cost to the Commission, which will result 
from diverting resources from overseeing mutual funds to overseeing hedge fund 
advisors. After all, there are more than 90 million mutual fund investors, compared to 
an estimated 100,000 to 200,000 hedge fund investors . . . . 
Id. (emphasis added); see Government Accountability Office, Report to Congressional 
Requesters, Mutual Fund Industry: SEC’s Revised Examination Approach Offers 
Potential Benefits, but Significant Oversight Challenges Remain, Report No. 05-415, 
Aug. 2005, available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05415.pdf, at 35 (citing hedge 
fund oversight challenges in the SEC’s mutual fund examination program and 
questioned the “SEC’s capacity to effectively monitor the hedge fund industry given the 
tradeoffs that the agency has had to make in overseeing the mutual fund industry.”); 
Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 875 (stating that hedge funds “have historically been understood 
not to present the same dangers to public markets as more widely available investment 
companies, like mutual funds”); CNBC report, Nov. 29, 2006 (stating that mutual fund 
assets rose to $10.01 trillion in October 2006, and hedge fund assets rose to $2 trillion 
in the same month, according to Investment Company Institute (“ICI”) and HFM Week 
data (respectively)); Melanie Waddell, Will the SEC Appeal? Dealing with hedge fund 
registration’s legal challenge, INVESTMENTADVISOR, Aug. 2006, available at 
http://www.investmentadvisor.com/article.php?topic=Alternative+Investments&article
=6648 (last visited Dec. 5, 2006) (“During a conversation with Lori Richards, director 
of the SEC’s Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations (OCIE), earlier this 
year, she admitted that the SEC’s exam staff is overextended.”). 
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B. The Former Registration Regime’s Virtually Presumptive Exemption 
Absent an exemption, an investment adviser was generally required 
to register with the SEC.36  The proposal of the revised and so-called 
“Hedge Fund Rule”37 signaled the threat of a sweeping departure from 
the former hedge investment adviser regulatory regime.  Section 
203(b)(3) of the Advisers Act formerly excluded hedge fund investment 
advisers from registration requirements (among other regulatory 
requirements), provided only that direct investment advice was given to 
less than fifteen “clients,” a figure that was formerly tabulated by the 
number of private fund entities directly advised.38  For purposes of 
determining an adviser exemption, a rolling prior twelve month client 
counting method was used.39  Many hedge fund investment advisers had 
 
 36. See generally § 203(b)(3) of Advisers Act 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3) [hereinafter 
Registration of Investment Advisers]; see 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a which states that: 
No investment adviser that is regulated or required to be regulated as an investment 
adviser in the State in which it maintains its principal office and place of business 
shall register under section 80b-3 of this title, unless the investment adviser- 
(A) has assets under management of not less than $25,000,000, or such higher amount 
as the Commission may, by rule, deem appropriate in accordance with the purposes of 
this subchapter; 
15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a(a)(1)(A); 17 C.F.R. § 275-203A-1 [Eligibility for SEC 
Registration]; 17 CFR 275.203A-2 [Exemptions from prohibition on SEC registration]; 
Goldstein Complaint, supra note 15, at ¶ 25. 
[T]he Commission estimates that approximately half of the advisors [sic] to large 
hedge fends [sic] are currently registered. Advisers who have 15 or more clients, 
whether funds or individuals, to whom they provide personalized advice must register 
because they do not fall within the terms of the exemption.  Many advisers, even 
though exempt, also register with the Commission voluntarily for competitive reasons 
or because their investors demand it. 
Id. 
 37. See SEC’s Appell. Brief, supra note 5. 
 38. Rule 203(b)(3) of the Advisers Act 17; CFR § 275.203(b)(3) (adopted by the 
SEC in late 2004).  But see Rule 203(b)(3)-2 of the Advisers Act 17; 
CFR § 275.203(b)(3)-2 (adopted by the SEC in late 2004).   This required an investment 
adviser of a “private fund” to look through and count each investor of the fund as a 
single client – for purposes of Adviser Act registration requirement.  This rule was 
vacated by Goldstein.  See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 876 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 39. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3); Rule 203(b)(3)-1; 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-1).  
Vacated by Goldstein, 473 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006).  Advisers to private pooled 
investments, such as hedge funds, depended on the SEC Staff’s perspective that a 
private fund, rather than the beneficial owner-investors in that fund, was considered to 
be the firm’s “client” for purposes of the exemption provided in § 203(b)(3) of the 
Advisers Act.  This “private adviser exemption” provision was codified in Advisers Act 
Rule 203(b)(3)-1, which allows a “private fund” to be treated as a “client” for purposes 
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previously been exempted from the Advisers Act registration 
provisions,40 despite the fact that the Act was “[e]nacted by Congress to 
‘substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat 
emptor’ in the investment advisory profession,”41
Under the statute, an investment adviser was considered to be 
exempt from registration provided it (i) had fourteen or fewer “clients”42 
during the preceding twelve months, (ii) did not hold itself out generally 
to the public as an investment adviser, and (iii) was not an adviser to any 
of the § 203(b)(3) exemption, provided the investment advice given to the “private 
fund” was based on the fund-client’s financial objectives rather than the individual 
investment objectives of the fund’s investors.  Id.  However, the Rule provided at least 
one alternative method for counting “clients”: 
The 1985 “Safe Harbor” of Rule 203(b)(3)-1 is not the only method for determining 
who might be considered a “client” for purposes of § 203(b)(3).  For example, 
paragraph (a)(2) of the Rule indicates that an Adviser may count as one client any 
“corporation, general partnership, limited partnership, limited liability company, 
trust . . . or other legal organization . . . to which [the Adviser] provide[s] investment 
advice based on its investment objectives rather than the individual investment 
objectives of its shareholders, partners, limited partners, members, or 
beneficiaries . . . .” 
Id. (quoting § 203(a)(2)).  As such, an Adviser with investment discretion over less than 
15 “clients” was not required to register with the SEC.  This rule was apparently 
adopted to address the inference drawn by Abrahamson v. Fleschner, which held that a 
limited partnership’s general partner investing in securities was considered an 
“investment adviser” within the context of the Advisers Act.  Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 
568 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978) overruled on other 
grounds by Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979).  
Incidentally, the first circulated opinion in Abrahamson indicated that the limited 
partners were also considered to be “clients” under this standard, but that portion of the 
opinion was redacted from the amended published version according to the SEC’s 
Appell. Brief.  See SEC’s Appell. Brief, supra note 5, at 22 n.7 (citing Robert Hacker & 
Ronald Rotunda, SEC Registration of Private Investment Partnerships after 
Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1471, 1484 n.72 (1978)) (“The court’s 
original opinion stated, ‘the general partners were the investment advisers to the limited 
partners.’ The court’s amended opinion deleted ‘to the limited partners.’”). 
 40. See generally Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund 
Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2266 (July 20, 2004), 69 Fed. Reg. 
45,172 (July 28, 2004). 
 41. See Goldstein, 436 F.3d at 876 (citing SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 
Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)). 
 42. In order to comply with the so-called “Hedge Fund Rule,” investment advisers 
were required to “look through” and count each shareholder, limited partner, member or 
beneficiary of a “private fund” towards the fourteen or fewer client threshold of the 
“private adviser exemption.”  Rule 203(b)(3)-2 of the Advisers Act. 
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registered investment company.43  The practical effect of the former 
Rule with its broad exemption provisions was that virtually all hedge 
fund advisers had been eligible for exemption and could avoid 
registration altogether.  It permitted hedge fund advisers freedom to 
operate in a largely secretive manner, without interference or federal 
oversight and in stark contrast with the above referenced “full 
disclosure” philosophy of the 1940 Advisers Act.44
C. Regulatory Response to Hedge Fund Growth and  
Perceived Secondary Effects 
Responding to the accelerating trend of explosive hedge fund 
growth, the Commission directed its staff to undertake a comprehensive 
investigation of hedge fund activities in 2002.45  The SEC staff produced 
an extensive study in 2003 that identified key areas for concern 
regarding the changing dynamics of the hedge fund sector—some of the 
notable potential underlying problems identified by the 2003 SEC report 
included (i) a lack of information regarding what is arguably the fastest-
 
 43. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3).  Exempted “private advisers” remain subject to 
anti-fraud provisions of the federal securities laws.  See, e.g., § 10(b) of the 1934 
Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder (15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) and 
17 C.F.R. § 240-10b.5); § 206 of the Advisers Act (15 U.S.C. § 80b-6). 
 44. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 45. See 2003 SEC Staff Report, supra note 23; see also Registration Under the 
Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054 (Dec. 10, 2004) 
(codified at 17 C.F.R. Parts 275 and 279 (2004), available at 2004 WL 2825810 
[hereinafter Investment Adviser Registration Final Rule]).  The Hedge Fund Advisers 
Rule took effect on February 10, 2005 “except for the amendments to § 275.206(4)-2 
[Rule 206(4)-2] and § 279.1 [Form ADV], which bec[a]me effective January 10, 2005.”  
Id.  The 2003 SEC Staff Report made a number of findings that formed the primary 
bases for implementing the Hedge Fund Adviser Rule: 
In 2002, we requested that our staff investigate the activities of hedge funds and hedge 
fund advisers.  First, we were aware that the number and size of hedge funds were 
rapidly growing and that this growth could have broad consequences for the securities 
markets for which we are responsible.  Second, we were bringing a growing number 
of enforcement cases in which hedge fund advisers defrauded hedge fund investors, 
who typically were able to recover few of their assets.  Third, we were concerned that 
the activities of hedge funds today might affect a broader group of persons than the 
relatively few wealthy individuals and families who had historically invested in hedge 
funds. We directed the staff to develop information for us on a number of related 
topics, and advise us whether we should exercise greater regulatory authority over the 
hedge fund industry. 
Id. at 72,055 n.15 (internal citation omitted). 
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growing sector of the U.S. financial system, (ii) an increasing incidence 
of fraudulent activity involving hedge fund advisers, and (iii) a trend 
towards “retailization” (hedge fund investments held by less 
sophisticated individuals (see Part III.B.3 below)).46  The 2003 SEC 
Staff Report findings served as the primary bases for promulgation of 
the Rule at issue in Goldstein. 
After the SEC staff review and in apparent response to its reported 
findings,47 the Commission adopted a revised investment adviser 
registration Rule48 that would effectively govern a wide swath of the 
hedge fund sector by and through its grant of regulatory authority 
pursuant to the Advisers Act.49  The Advisers Act established the 
boundaries of conduct for a segment of registered advisers under the 
prior registration regime since 197050 and regulated certain aspects of 
 46. Id. at 72,055 (citing 2003 SEC Staff Report, see supra note 23).  The SEC 
implementation of the Rule noted concern regarding the explosive growth of hedge 
funds and the increasing influence over the capital markets: 
In September 2003, the staff published a report entitled Implications of the Growth of 
Hedge Funds. The 2003 Staff Hedge Fund Report describes the operation of hedge 
funds and raises a number of important public policy concerns. The report focused on 
investor protection concerns raised by the growth of hedge funds. The 2003 Staff 
Hedge Fund Report confirmed and further developed several of our concerns 
regarding hedge funds and hedge fund advisers. 
Id. 
 47. Investment Adviser Registration Final Rule, supra note 45. 
 48. See Id.; 17 C.F.R. § 275.203 (b)(3)-1 (Rule 203 (b)(3)); The Investment 
Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413 (1970) 
[hereinafter 1970 Amendments Act] (Prior to 2004, investment advisers with fewer than 
15 “client” during the preceding 12 months, were specifically exempted from Section 
203(b)(3) of the Advisers Act; Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 879 (D.C. Cir. 2006).  
The Goldstein court looked to the 1970 amendment of the Advisers Act for inferences 
of how Congress contemplated counting “clients”: 
On the other hand, a 1970 amendment to § 203 appears to reflect Congress’s 
understanding at the time that investment company entities, not their shareholders, 
were the advisers’ clients.  In the amendment, Congress eliminated a separate 
exemption from registration for advisers who advised only investment companies and 
explicitly made the fewer-than-fifteen-clients exemption unavailable to such advisers.  
Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 24, 84 Stat. 
1413, 1430 (1970).  This latter prohibition would have been unnecessary if the 
shareholders of investment companies could be counted as “clients.” 
Goldstein, 473 F.3d at 879. 
 49. See Advisers Act, supra note 14; see also “Rules Under the Investment Adviser 
Act,” 17 C.F.R. § 275.01; and SEC 2003 Staff Report, supra note 23. 
 50. See 1970 Amendments Act, supra note 48; see Goldstein Complaint, supra 
note 15, at ¶ 26 (“[A]ll advisers, registered or unregistered, must report beneficial 
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unregistered investment advisers to a lesser extent.51  The Rule and its 
new method of client counting had seemingly closed the loophole that 
the hedge fund sector had previously relied upon for almost unfettered 
opacity. 
In order to determine whether an investment adviser was eligible 
for exemption from registration pursuant to the proposed and so-called 
“Hedge Fund Rule,”52 hedge fund managers were required to count each 
individual investor-shareholder of a private fund under management as a 
separate “client” (instead of the former method of counting only the 
private fund entities that directly received investment advice as 
“clients”).53  As a result, almost every hedge fund adviser in America 
would no longer be exempt and would be potentially subject to the 
registration requirements, based on the Rule’s more inclusive new 
definition of “client,” as well as being subjected to periodic SEC audits, 
required filings and disclosures, restrictions on the charging of 
performance fees and the possibility of unannounced SEC examinations 
of books and records.54
ownership of securities in excess of a certain amount under Section 13(d) and (g) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”), and must further file quarterly 
reports of security positions under Section 13(f) of the Exchange Act if they manage in 
excess of $100 million in assets.”). 
 51. See 2003 SEC Staff Report, supra note 23, at 88-89 (The SEC adoption of the 
main recommendation of the 2003 Staff Report to amend Rule 203(b)(3)-1 of the 
Advisers Act (the “Safe Harbor Rule”), eliminated that “safe harbor” by requiring 
managers of so-called “private funds” to count as a separate client each investor 
(beneficial owner/shareholder) in a hedge fund); 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3) (2000) (Small 
Advisor Exemption); 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-1(a)(2)(i) (2003) (allowing 
corporations, limited and general partnerships, and limited liability companies to be 
counted as single “clients”); see also Goldstein Complaint, supra note 15, at ¶ 20. 
 52. See 1970 Amendments Act, supra note 48 (discussing investment advisers and 
their affiliates, and mutual fund directors; breach of fiduciary duty was addressed in this 
amendment in Section 36). 
 53. In order to comply with the so-called “Hedge Fund Rule,” Advisers were 
required to “look through” and count each shareholder, limited partner, member, or 
other investor of a “private fund” towards the fourteen or fewer “client” threshold of the 
“private adviser exemption.”  See Investment Adviser Registration Final Rule, supra 
note 45, at 72,065. 
Our actions today withdraw that safe harbor and require advisers to “private funds”—
which will include most hedge funds—to “look through” the funds to count the 
number of investors as “clients” for purposes of the private adviser exemption. 
Id. 
 54. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4 [hereinafter Reports by Investment Advisers]; 
Steven B. Nadel, U.S. Regulation of Private Investment Funds, 37 REV. OF SEC. & 
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It is a distinct possibility that the SEC encountered pressure to 
accelerate its hedge fund regulation in the aftermath of the mutual fund 
market timing scandal that Massachusetts Secretary of the 
Commonwealth William Galvin characterized as allowing “hedge funds 
[to] buy shares in mutual funds is like putting a shark in a goldfish 
tank.”55  Perhaps it was a source of embarrassment at the federal level 
that then-New York Attorney General, Eliot Spitzer, swept in with the 
extensive powers of the Martin Act56 and demanded substantial 
COMMODITIES REG. 47 (Mar. 17, 2004), available at http://www.sewkis.com 
/Documents/attachments/599.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2007). 
 55. See Investment Adviser Registration Final Rule, supra note 45, at 72,057.  
Perhaps most disturbing is that hedge fund advisers have been key participants in the 
recent scandals involving late trading and inappropriate market timing of mutual fund 
shares.  See also Goldstein Complaint, supra note 15, at ¶ 37.  See also Allan Sloan, 
The Mutual Fund Scandal: Unfair Fight, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 8, 2003, available at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3606191/ (last visited Dec. 5, 2006).  Newsweek 
reported that the SEC has been playing catch-up to state regulators like Mr. Spitzer and 
Massachusetts Secretary of the Commonwealth William Galvin: 
Hedge funds have been involved in most of the allegations of wrong-doing, which 
first surfaced in September when New York’s Spitzer brought a case against four fund 
companies and a big hedge fund, Canary Capital.  [William] Galvin, the 
Massachusetts secretary of [the Commonwealth], says, “Letting hedge funds buy 
shares in mutual funds is like putting a shark in a goldfish tank.”  The SEC, which is 
supposed to regulate mutual funds, has been scrambling to catch up with Spitzer and 
Galvin, and has vowed changes. 
Id. 
 56. NY GEN. BUS. LAW, Art. 23-A, § 352 (McKinney 1996); see also Janice Revell 
and David Stires, Making Sense of the Mutual Fund Scandal Everything you may not 
want to ask (but really should know) about the crisis that’s rocking the investment 
world, FORTUNE, Nov. 24, 2003, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_ 
archive/2003/11/24/353794/index.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2006) [hereinafter Revell].  
CNN Money reported that Mr. Spitzer’s market timing investigation led to “widespread 
criticism” of the SEC, including from at least one former Commission staff attorneys: 
How did the scandal get started? 
The crisis erupted in September, when New York attorney general Eliot Spitzer 
alleged that four mutual fund companies had struck illicit relationships with Canary 
Capital Partners, a New Jersey hedge fund.   Spitzer charged that Bank of America’s 
fund business allowed Canary to trade several funds after the markets had already 
closed at that day’s prices.  Known as “late trading,” this illegal practice allowed 
Canary to trade on after-hours news (such as earnings announcements) at before-
closing prices.  Spitzer also charged that Banc One, Janus, and Strong (see “Up 
Against the Wall”) allowed Canary to quickly jump in and out of their mutual funds to 
make a fast profit, a practice known as “market timing.”  While market timing is not 
illegal per se, fund companies can violate securities law if they state in their fund 
prospectuses that they discourage market timing but then make exceptions for “select” 
investors or their own employees. . . .  Industry experts say that market timing of 
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monetary concessions as a result of alleged “front-running” 
malfeasance.57  SEC staffers apparently first learned of Mr. Spitzer’s 
enforcement conquest in published reports only after the New York 
Attorney General’s office had already hammered out the first of its 
market timing settlements.58  It remains possible, as the Goldstein 
petitioners pleadings strongly suggested, that state regulatory prowess 
may have contributed to the SEC’s motivation to expand its hedge fund 
oversight authority.59  During a recent visit to Fordham University 
mutual fund shares is hardly a new phenomenon.  And the SEC’s failure to lead the 
way in uncovering recent scandals has led to widespread criticism of the commission.  
The SEC does perform detailed inspections of mutual fund firms every three years or 
so, about 90% of which result in the issuance of “deficiency letters,” which outline 
ethical violations ranging from minor to extremely serious.  But fund management 
doesn’t have to disclose the contents of the deficiency letters either to fund 
shareholders or to its own board of directors.  “Ninety-five percent of what managers 
are doing wrong never is made public,” says Edward Siedle, a former attorney for the 
SEC who now investigates abuses at money-management firms for pension funds.  If 
they were, he adds, they would be guaranteed to scare off a lot of investors. 
Id. 
 57. See, e.g., N.Y. Att’y Gen. Dep’t of Law Press Release, Spitzer, SEC Reach 
Largest Mutual Fund Settlement Ever, Bank of America, FleetBoston Agree to Pay 
$675 Million and Adopt Precedent-Setting Reforms to Improve Accountability, Mar. 15, 
2004, available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press /2004/mar/mar15c_04.html; see 
also Revell, supra note 56.  CNN Money reported that mutual fund “front-running” was 
on the SEC’s regulatory radar as early as 1998: 
[A] 1998 deficiency letter [was] issued by the SEC to a firm that was later purchased 
by one of the country’s largest mutual funds.  The letter contains details of more than 
two dozen occasions when a senior executive bought and sold individual stock 
positions in his personal account before trading the same stocks for his clients—a 
highly unethical (and in many circumstances illegal) kind of trading known as front-
running. 
Id. 
 58. See, e.g., New York Attorney General, press release, State Investigation 
Reveals Mutual Fund Fraud, Sept. 3, 2003, available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us 
/press/2003/sep/sep03a_03.html. 
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer announced today that his office has obtained evidence 
of widespread illegal trading schemes that potentially cost mutual fund shareholders 
billions of dollars annually. 
Spitzer announced that one of the perpetrators of the schemes – a hedge fund and its 
managers – has agreed to make restitution $30 million in illegal profits generated 
from unlawful trading and pay a $10 million penalty.  The agreement further commits 
the hedge fund and its officers and employees to continue to cooperate in the Attorney 
General’s ongoing investigation of the mutual fund industry. 
Id.; Complaint in the Matter of State of New York v. Canary Capital Partners, LLC et 
al., available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2003/sep/canary_complaint.pdf. 
 59. See Goldstein Complaint, supra note 15, at ¶¶ 36-38. 
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School of Law, Governor Spitzer (then-New York Attorney General) 
remarked that the controversial registration regime “will not reveal any 
of the underlying problems.”60  Mr. Spitzer’s successor, Attorney 
General Andrew M. Cuomo, has followed suit and not articulated any 
 60. Former N.Y. Attorney General Eliot Spitzer Remarks, Fifth Annual Albert A. 
DeStefano Lecture on Corporate, Securities & Financial Law at Fordham University, 11 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1, 27-28 (2005).  Governor Spitzer commented to an 
audience at Fordham University School of Law: 
I do not have any plans for hedge-fund regulation.  Occasionally - more than 
occasionally - I am asked, “Do you think the SEC is doing something smart or not in 
requiring hedge funds to register?”  I do not think there is any great harm that results 
from it.  I also don’t think there is any great good.  The reason for that is that the 
registration form itself will not reveal any of the underlying problems. 
Hedge funds do some bad things.  Hedge funds sometimes take short positions and 
intentionally circulate misinformation to try to drive the stock down, to benefit from a 
short position.  But that is not a game that is intrinsic to being a hedge fund.  In other 
words, there is nothing about the hedge-fund structure, as a structure, that I have seen 
that is problematic.  In fact, I would argue that, in a way, a hedge fund is more closely 
aligned with the interest of its investor, because usually, the way their fees are 
structured, you get one percent, two percent as a fee, and then an override.  So the 
fund manager wants to do well, wants to perform well, and his investors will do well 
as a result. 
The improprieties come in their trading practices.  Those trading practices have to be 
addressed, and should be addressed.  But those are not trading practices that result 
because they are hedge funds.  They are just games that are played in the marketplace 
on a regular basis by all sorts of investors. 
One area where hedge funds do often get into trouble is in valuation of their portfolio.  
The reason for that does go back to the compensation system.  If a hedge-fund 
manager gets an override, if you have been up by more than twenty percent in any 
given year, if you have a portfolio of liquid stocks, you can mark-to-market every day.  
That is easy. If you have a portfolio of thinly traded debt, then you can come up with a 
valuation that may not be a real one, go back to your investors and say, “Look at what 
a great year we had.  You owe me ‘X’ dollars,” and it may not be a real market 
valuation. 
But that is, I think, a secondary issue. 
Id.; see Alex Akesson, Hedge Funds Sued by Attorney General, HEDGECO.NET, Nov. 
17, 2006, http://www.hedgeco.net/news/11/2006/hedge-funds-sued-by-attorney-
general.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2006).  A hedge fund news website noted that Mr. 
Spitzer alleged that certain hedge funds were involved in the alleged market timing 
schemes: 
State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer sued Samaritan Asset Management Services Inc, 
their advisors, Johnson Capital Management Inc, and Edward Owens, a principal at 
the hedge fund.  The company allegedly engaged in a fraudulent mutual fund market-
timing scheme.  The defendants secretly “piggy-backed” their trades on the 
investment accounts of retirement plans.  The suit claims that the market timing trades 
hurt long-term investors and the suit seeks restitution and an order to stop them from 
carrying out improper trades. 
Akesson, Hedge Funds Sued by Attorney General, HEDGECO.NET. 
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state registration program for hedge fund investment advisers as a 
regulatory priority.61  SEC Commissioner Paul Atkins wondered in a 
New York Bar Association speech whether SEC staff members had not 
funneled data into the hedge fund category in order to justify and 
facilitate the registration rule-making agenda.62  According to 
Commissioner Atkins, the SEC “rushed this rule with little analysis or 
consideration to the ramifications.”63  Mr. Atkins has also quoted former 
 61. See, e.g., Russ Buettner, Cuomo Turns to Hedge Fund and It Pays Off, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 6, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/06/nyregion/06hedge.html?ex= 
1317787200&en=5092a7fa664cad61&ei=5090&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss (last 
visited Dec. 6, 2006) (reporting that “[t]wo years ago, Andrew M. Cuomo put more 
than half of his campaign treasury into a hedge fund, making him one of the few New 
York politicians to invest campaign money in anything riskier than a sure bet”); A 
campaign hedge: Andrew Cuomo realizes a nice return by investing in a high yield 
fund, ALBANY TIMES-UNION, Oct. 11, 2006.  Mr. Cuomo’s campaign for New York 
Attorney General actually invested a portion of its political “war chest” in a hedge fund: 
In the case of Andrew Cuomo, the Democratic candidate for attorney general, an 
investment of $750,000 of campaign contributions in a hedge fund two years ago paid 
off nicely—with a return of almost 20 percent in just a year.  It also represents a 
particularly slippery slope for a business, political fundraising, that already smacks of 
high stakes . . . .  In Mr. Cuomo’s case, some special arrangements were made, 
including the waiving of minimum investment requirements by EnTrust, according to 
a New York Times report. 
As it happens, Mr. Cuomo is also as committed to sweeping campaign finance reform 
as anyone on the ballot in New York this year. He speaks of a determination to 
enforce all available laws to end the culture of pay to play that pervades state 
government. 
Id. 
 62. See Speech, supra note 35.  Commissioner Atkins stated that: 
It is true that the rule’s proponents have an incentive to find problems in order to show 
how necessary the rule was in the first place.  I anticipate a bandying about of hedge 
fund fraud statistics as evidence that the registration mandate was long overdue. My 
experience with hedge fund fraud statistics before the adoption of the rule means that I 
will look at such statistics with a skeptical eye.  As Commissioner Glassman’s and my 
analysis of the cases that were cited in support the rule revealed, lots of types of cases 
get labeled as hedge fund cases.  The 51 cases that were cited in the Adopting Release 
as evidence of a, “troubling growth in the number of our hedge fund fraud 
enforcement cases” largely implicated advisors who would have been too small to be 
registered with the Commission, were already registered in some capacity, should 
have been registered, or were simply garden-variety fraudsters.  The cynic in me 
wonders whether, if the Commission decides to turn its attention to venture capital 
and private equity funds, the “hedge fund” cases will get relabeled. 
Id. (citing Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2266 (July 20, 2004), 69 FR 45171, 
(July 28, 2004)). 
 63. See Lee Conrad, Compliance: Hedge Fund Registration Sparks Broad 
Criticism, US BANKER, Dec. 2004, available at http://www.us-
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Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan who stated that the “initiative 
cannot accomplish what it seeks to accomplish.”64  Former 
Commissioner Cynthia A. Glassman has also publicly remarked that the 
former SEC Chairman Donaldson era remnant65 was little more than a 
“heavy-handed way of regulating the hedge fund industry,”66 and 
apparently many industry professionals shared Ms. Glassman’s pointed 
observations.67  The Rule was presumably designed to eliminate the 
availability of the private adviser exemption for “essentially all”68 
advisers, and bring much of the hedge fund sector under the specter of 
federal regulatory oversight, pushing all but a slim minority of advisers 
beyond the newly defined threshold.69  However, as Commissioner 
Atkins suggested, it may have been the hurried pace of promulgation 
that led to the Rule’s demise. 
D. Proposed “Hedge Fund Rule” Met With Industry Resistance 
The controversial registration regime was met with “vigorous 
dissent” from two of five SEC Commissioners and faced zealous 
 
banker.com/article.html?id=20041201J3Q4VGSK (last visited April 24, 2007). 
 64. Id. 
 65. William H. Donaldson was SEC Chairman when the so-called “Hedge Fund 
Rule” rule-making process was initiated.  See SEC Biography: Chairman William H. 
Donaldson, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/commissioner/donaldson.htm (last 
visited Dec. 5, 2006). 
 66. Kevin J. Shay, SEC Member Dismayed that SOX Costs, Burdens Still High, 
BETHESDA GAZETTE, Nov. 4, 2005, available at http://gazette.net 
/stories/110405/businew180555_31896.shtml (last visited April 24, 2007). 
 67. See Conrad, supra note 63. 
The [SEC’s] decision to register most of the estimated 8,350 hedge funds is drawing 
heavy criticism from the business community and some government officials.  The SEC 
says the rule, passed on October 26 [2004], will help protect investors and decrease 
fraud.  Nearly 400 hedge funds have been identified by the SEC as being involved in 
late trading and inappropriate market-timing cases, which hurts mutual-fund investors 
because mutual funds are large enough to be market movers, the agency says. 
Id. 
 68. See Goldstein Complaint, supra note 15, at 1. 
 69. See C. Evan Stewart, The Wrong Track to Reforming Corporate Governance, 
GC NEW YORK, Oct. 10, 2006, available at http://www.zuckerman.com 
/media/news/media.168.pdf (last visited April 24, 2007) (explaining that in regulating 
hedge funds the SEC defined registration as “inter alia: (i) filing disclosures on Form 
ADV; (ii) adopting a compliance program; (iii) adopting a code of ethics; and (iv) being 
subject to SEC examinations”). 
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industry opposition.70  Nonetheless, a sharply divided SEC adopted the 
Rule, portions of which took effect on January 10, 2005 (certain other 
remaining aspects took effect on February 10, 2005).71  All affected 
advisers were to have registered via “Form ADV”72 and employ the 
other newly promulgated requirements not later than February 1, 2006.73  
The proposed Rule ignited one of the more widely reported regulatory 
conflicts in recent market history, and included publication of both 
Commissioner Atkins’s and Glassman’s dissents.74
A significant number of hedge fund investment advisers who had 
previously relied upon the “private adviser exemption” in order to avoid 
registration with the SEC were faced with the dilemma of whether to 
register in compliance with the Rule, find a new “loophole” to exempt 
them from registration, or to simply disobey the new disclosure 
 70. See Kenneth J. Berman et al., Hedge Fund Investment Advisers: To Be or Not 
to Be (Registered)?, 20 INVESTMENT ADVISER 9, Sept. 2006, at 11 n.6; Speech, supra 
note 35 (Commissioner Atkins noted that, “[a]s you know, in October of 2004, one 
week before the 2004 elections, the Commission adopted the hedge fund registration 
mandate over my objections and those of my colleague, Commissioner Glassman”). 
At the meeting adopting the rule, Commissioner Glassman famously asked the staff if 
they had talked to the other regulators regarding alternatives to our registration 
requirement. Upon getting the response that yes, they had, she asked: “Well, did you 
listen to what they had to say?” 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 71. Investment Adviser Registration Final Rule, supra note 45.  The Final Rule, as 
published, included the dissent of Commissioners Atkins and Glassman in a section 
titled, “Dissent of Commissioners Cynthia A. Glassman and Paul S. Atkins to the 
Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers”: 
Four months ago, the majority proposed to regulate hedge fund advisers over our 
dissent. We were nevertheless hopeful that a careful review of commentary on the 
proposal would convince the majority, instead of taking further action on this 
proposal, to consider better alternatives. Our hope was fueled by the fact that many 
commenters offered excellent insights and recommendations to the Commission.  We 
are disappointed that the majority, unmoved by the chorus of credible concerns from 
diverse voices, has determined to adopt the hedge fund registration rules largely as 
proposed.  As discussed below, we continue to agree that we need more information 
on hedge funds, but we disagree with the majority’s solution. 
Id. 
 72. See SEC Form ADV, available at http://sec.gov/answers/formadv.htm (last 
visited Apr. 13, 2007). 
 73. See, e.g., Reports by Investment Advisers, supra note 55 (Hedge Fund 
Investment Adviser books and records requirement and SEC power of examination); 
see Goldstein Complaint, supra note 15, at ¶ 21; see also Conrad, supra note 63. 
 74. See Investment Adviser Registration Final Rule, supra note 45. 
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regime.75  Many advisers increased the “lock-up periods” for their funds 
in order to circumvent the reporting requirements.76  Many other 
advisers apparently elected to comply with the Rule, but according to 
Commissioner Atkins, a significant number of leading hedge funds 
chose to disregard the Rule.77
And at least one hedge fund adviser, market maverick Phillip 
Goldstein,78 the irascible manager of the “Bulldog Investors” fund 
 75. See § 203(b)(3) of Advisers Act, supra note 36. 
 76. See, e.g., Susan L. Barreto, Hedge Fund Adviser Registration Tops 2,000 Post-
Goldstein, INVESTMENT ADVISOR, Aug. 7, 2006 (“The experience of Sellers Capital 
sums up the choices many hedge fund managers faced in deciding whether or not to 
register.  The firm’s founder, Mark A. Sellers, originally imposed a two-year lock-up 
and told investors that if they didn’t want the longer lock-up they needed to invest 
before Feb. 1 [2006]”), available at http://www.investmentadvisor.com/article.php 
?topic=Hedge+Funds&article=6717; see Bingham-McCutchen, Hedge Fund Ruling: 
What’s Next?, INVESTMENT MGMT. ALERT , June 2006, at n.2 (“Many hedge fund 
managers chose not to register by instituting a two-year lock-up as to all new 
investments received on or after February 1, 2006, which allowed them to continue to 
count the fund as the client rather than each of the investors in the fund.”), available at 
http://www.bingham.com/bingham/webadmin/documents/radD7D5C.pdf; In The 
Matter Of: Bulldog Investors General Partnership et al., Docket No. E-07-0002, at 70, 
available at http://www.sec.state.ma.us/sct/sctpdf/bulldogcomplaint.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 18, 2007); Massachusetts Commonwealth Secretary’s Exhibit C-4, Goldstein-
Dakos “Dear Partner” letter dated July 13, 2006. 
Like many other respected and successful private investment partnerships, we recently 
instituted a two-year lockup for new contributions . . . .  A secondary benefit was that 
a two-year lockup allowed us to avoid the costly red tape that goes with registration 
while our lawsuit was pending . . . .  Assuming the SEC does not appeal the 
[Goldstein] decision, we may modify the lockup policy. 
Id. 
 77. Commissioner Atkins NY Bar Assoc.  Speech, supra note 35 (noting that, “we 
have seen more than one thousand new hedge fund advisor registrants . . . .  The newly 
registered hedge fund advisors have approximately doubled the pool of hedge fund 
registrants.”).  The number of registered Advisers reportedly more than doubled again 
within one month of Commissioner Atkins’s speech: “[b]y June 2006, approximately 
2,400 hedge fund advisers had registered with the commission, including more than 
1,100 who had registered after Feb. 1 (this is out of a total universe of circa 9,000 
funds).”  Id.; see also C. Evan Stewart, The Wrong Track to Reforming Corporate 
Governance, GC NEW YORK, Oct. 10, 2006, available at 
http://www.zuckerman.com/media/news/media.168.pdf (last visited Apr. 13, 2007). 
 78. Mr. Goldstein refers to himself as “a widely-quoted expert on value investing 
and corporate governance.”  BULLDOGINVESTORS.COM, available at 
http://www.bulldoginvestors.com.  The “Bulldog” website utilizes “masking” 
technology that conceals most of the site’s “deep links.”  Moreover, the “Bulldog” 
website was removed from the Internet in response to an administrative action brought 
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family, stood firm in his defiance of the Rule, alleging that it was invalid 
as an arbitrary and capricious abuse of administrative rulemaking 
authority under an apparent ultra vires theory, despite the traditional 
deference afforded to the Commission’s “substantial discretion as to 
whether to proceed by rulemaking or adjudication.”79  Mr. Goldstein 
already had a history of taking the SEC to task,80 and thrusting his 
by Massachusetts Secretary of the Commonwealth William Galvin on January 31, 2007.  
See Edward Pekarek, Hogging the Hedge: The “Bulldog’s” 13F Theory May Not Be So 
Lucky, 12 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 1077 (2007) at Part VII.D.1 (discussing the 
“Bulldog” website and the Massachusetts administrative matter)].  But see the “Internet 
Archive,” particularly the “Principals” page of the “Bulldog” website, available at 
http://web.archive.org/web/20060116131029/http://www.bulldoginvestors.com/ (last 
visited April 24, 2007).  Incidentally, the “Press Room” portion of the “Bulldog” 
website includes a variety of media articles regarding Mr. Goldstein’s many proxy 
battles, but for some reason, barely notes media coverage of Goldstein.  See 
http://www.bulldoginvestors.com/pdf.php?ID=20 (last visited April 24, 2007); see also 
Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 79. Opening Brief of Petitioner at 25, Goldstein v. SEC, No. 04-1434, 2005 WL 
1666937 (D.C. Cir. 2005) [hereinafter Goldstein Opening Brief] (“Finally, the Rule is 
unreasonable because the SEC’s development and evaluation of the record was arbitrary 
and capricious.”); see also id. at 56 (“In sum, the SEC’s development and consideration 
of the record was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.”).  The Goldstein theory of the 
case did not specifically allege that SEC rule-making was an ultra vires act, but 
repeatedly asserted that the SEC exceeded the authority granted to it by Congress.  Id. 
This case involves the SEC’s adoption of the Hedge Fund Rule, which requires 
advisers to private investment entities known as hedge funds to register under the 
Advisers Act.  The Rule seeks to do what Congress has precluded the Commission 
from doing – regulate private investment entities and advisers that Congress has 
expressly exempted from regulation under the Investment Company Act and the 
Advisers Act. 
Id. at 8 (emphasis added); see also FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 
U.S. 775, 808 n.29 (1978) (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 201-02 (1947)). 
 80. See, e.g., Brief for Phillip Goldstein and Bulldog Investors as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondent Dabit in the matter of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 
Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71 (2006), available at 2005 WL 3485822; see Phillip Goldstein 
Letter to SEC, Mar. 14, 2004, Re: File No. S7-03-04 Investment Company Governance, 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s70304/pgoldstein031404.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 
2006) [hereinafter Goldstein Mar. 2004 SEC Letter].  Among the numerous seemingly 
taunting letters by Mr. Goldstein, is the following: 
Dear Mr. Katz: 
In the summer of 1967, some friends and I rented an apartment in Cape Cod.  One 
day, a girl brought us a turtle she found at a nearby stream.  She put the turtle on the 
floor to let it acclimate itself to its new home. But the turtle was frightened and 
proceeded to walk to the nearest wall.  It tried to climb up the wall for what seemed 
like hours but it never succeeded because turtles cannot climb walls.  Eventually, we 
felt sorry for the poor frustrated critter and put it back by the stream. 
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opinions into the center of securities law controversies.  This time he 
took his fight to Washington.81
Like our turtle, the Commission seems to be unable to grasp a basic truth, i.e., without 
appropriate incentives, tinkering with the governance structure of a fund cannot 
transform unwilling so-called independent directors into effective monitors of 
management. 
Id.; see Phillip Goldstein Letter to SEC [hereinafter Goldstein January 2004 SEC 
Letter], Jan. 30, 2004, Re: File No. S7-19-03 Security Holder Director Nominations, 
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s71903/pgoldstein013004.htm (last 
visited Dec. 1, 2006).  This mocking missive by Mr. Goldstein includes the absurd 
disclaimer to SEC staffers that his “critters” have expressed support: 
Dear Mr. Katz: 
I want to correct some misconceptions about the proposed proxy rules. 
First, a disclaimer. The views expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission or any of its Commissioners or staff 
members, any members of the American Bar Association, the Business Roundtable, 
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz or any other law firm representing corporate 
interests, any manager of any publicly traded corporation, my wife, my dog, my cat, 
any other member of my immediate family or anyone else although my wife and the 
critters have expressed support. 
Id. (emphasis added); see also Phillip Goldstein Letter to SEC, Dec. 22, 2003, Re: File 
No. S7-19-03 Security Holder Director Nominations http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed 
/s71903/pgoldstein122203.htm quoting Bob Dylan “Blowin’ in the Wind” © 1962. (last 
visited Dec. 1, 2006).  Mr. Goldstein wrote to the SEC in December 2003, citing Bob 
Dylan and making the ludicrous comparison between the nascent Iraqi democracy and 
proxy voting: 
The plain fact is that many persons are currently sitting in director’s [sic] chairs who 
would not be there if the Commission had adopted a rule that ensured that 
stockholders had a fair opportunity to vote for any bona fide nominee.  That was true 
in 1934 and that will continue to be true whether or not the Commission adopts rule 
[sic] 14a-11 as proposed. As Bob Dylan put it: 
Yes, ‘n’ how many years can some people exist 
Before they’re allowed to be free? 
Yes, ‘n’ how many times can a man turn his head, 
Pretending he just doesn’t see? 
The answer, my friend, is blowin’ in the wind, 
The answer is blowin’ in the wind. 
I hope the wind reaches 450 Fifth Street [SEC’s Washington, D.C. address] in my 
lifetime.  Until then, shame on anyone and everyone at the Commission who is 
responsible for not acting forcefully to eliminate the continuing disenfranchisement of 
stockholders and for producing a lame “compromise” proposal! 
In its bloated release, the Commission solicits responses to more than two hundred 
questions, most of which have nothing to do with ensuring that proxies are not utilized 
so as to frustrate fair corporate elections.  I have just one question for the 
Commission.  Who will get fair elections first: Iraqi citizen or American 
stockholders? American stockholders eagerly await a response. 
Id. 
 81. See generally Goldstein Complaint, supra note 15; see also Goldstein v. SEC, 
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III. MR. GOLDSTEIN GOES TO WASHINGTON 
Just eleven days after the SEC published the final Rule,82 the 
Goldstein petitioners83 filed substantially similar administrative agency 
review petitions concurrently with both the District Court for the District 
of Columbia and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit, ostensibly due to perceived jurisdictional ambiguities.84  The 
district court action was later stayed, pending the decision in the circuit 
court, pursuant to an unopposed petitioners’ motion.85  The Goldstein 
petitioners’ pleadings stated that the challenge arose under the 
Administrative Procedure Act, as well as the Advisers Act.86  Their 
pleadings also prominently relied upon the definitions of “client” and 
“investment adviser” as derived from the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
interpretation in Lowe v. SEC, and asserted that within the context of the 
Advisers Act, the SEC definition was arbitrary.87
451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 82. See generally Investment Adviser Registration Final Rule, supra note 45. 
 83. The named petitioners in the pleadings first filed in the D.C. District Court 
included: Phillip Goldstein and Goldstein-controlled entities Kimball & Winthrop, Inc. 
and Opportunity Partners L.P.  See Goldstein Complaint, supra note 15, at ¶¶ 8-10. 
 84. See Goldstein Opening Brief, supra note 79, at 4 (citing Investment Co. Inst. v. 
Board of Governors, 551 F.2d 1270, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1977)) (“Decisions of this Court 
indicate that where an agency’s governing statute provides for direct review of agency 
‘orders,’ but is unclear whether agency ‘rules’ are reviewable in the court of appeals, 
uncertainties about jurisdiction are resolved in favor of appellate court review.”). 
 85. See generally Petitioners’ Motion, with Respondent’s Consent, to Stay 
Proceedings, Pending Decision in Related Action by the United States Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit, 2004 WL 3144173 (D.D.C.) (filed Jan. 13, 2004); 
id. at ¶ 5.  The Goldstein petitioners stated with respect to question of the proper forum 
for the challenge of the Rule: 
On January 12, 2005, counsel for Plaintiffs and counsel for the SEC conferred by 
telephone regarding their views and positions regarding the proper forum for review 
of the Hedge Fund Rule.  Counsel for the SEC stated that the SEC believes the proper 
forum is the Court of Appeals and wants to avoid the wasteful duplication of litigating 
in both forums.  Counsel for Plaintiffs stated that they also believe the proper forum is 
the Court of Appeals but that Plaintiffs do not want to be delayed in challenging the 
Hedge Fund Rule in this Court if the Court of Appeals determines that this Court is 
the proper forum. 
Id. 
 86. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (“APA”); see also Adviser Act, supra note 14. 
 87. See Goldstein Complaint, supra note 15, at ¶ 18, citing Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 
181 (1985) (“[A]fter reviewing the legislative history of the Advisers Act, that the act 
was ‘designed to apply to those persons engaged in; the investment-advisory profession 
- those who provide personalized advice attuned to a client’s concerns, whether by 
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A “Client” By Any Other Name 
The Goldstein petitioners’ pleadings contended that in order to 
determine whether a hedge fund adviser was eligible for the “private 
adviser” exemption, one must first interpret the essence of the definition 
of the term “client,” and discern the legislative intent of the statutory 
construction within the Advisers Act.  The Goldstein petitioners asserted 
that the congressional intent was consistent with that articulated in the 
1985 U.S. Supreme Court decision Lowe v. SEC, and that it necessarily, 
albeit circularly, turns on whether an adviser “directly” provides 
“personalized advice attuned to a client’s concerns.”88  The Goldstein 
pleadings further asserted that, with respect to the 1985 “safe harbor” 
provision that created the “private adviser” exemption at issue, that the 
Commission 
proposed the safe harbor rule to make clear that it would not take the 
position that the limited partners of a limited partnership are 
“clients” of the general partner, as long as the general partner 
provided advice to the limited partnership and did not provide 
individualized personal investment advice to the limited partners[,] 
[and] [t]he safe harbor rule thus reflected not only the universally 
accepted meaning of the term “client,” but also Congress’s desire to 
regulate only those persons who render personalized investment 
advice attuned to a client’s concerns.89
The Commission correctly noted in its brief that when promulgating 
the Advisers Act, Congress did not establish how one could (or should) 
count “clients” for the purposes of the “private adviser” exemption.  
This suggests that the Goldstein petitioners’ assertion that the meaning 
of “client” was “universally accepted” was somewhat disingenuous.90  
Despite the history of the SEC’s previous use of “client,” the SEC 
presented a plausible interpretation of the term that may have persuaded 
Congress to amend the Act.91  Moreover, the Commission specifically 
“recognized in proposing the [1985] safe harbor that ‘a different 
 
written or verbal communication.’”) (citing Advisers Act, supra note 14). 
 88. Lowe, 472 U.S. 181 (1985); see Goldstein Complaint, supra note 15, at ¶ 22. 
 89. Goldstein Complaint, supra note 15, at ¶ 24 (emphasis added). 
 90. SEC’s Appell. Brief, supra note 5, at 2. 
 91. Id. at 2-3 (“[T]he proper construction of the statute might well require an 
adviser to count as its clients the investors whose assets were brought under 
management through an investment vehicle operated by the adviser, rather than 
counting only the vehicle itself.”) (emphasis added). 
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approach could be followed in counting clients.’”92
The same year that the SEC adopted the “safe harbor” for general 
partners of investment limited partnerships, the U.S. Supreme Court 
decided Lowe v. SEC.93  According to the Goldstein petitioners’ theory 
throughout the case, the Rule’s “look through” method of counting 
“clients” was inconsistent with congressional intent, with the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the term in Lowe,94 and with the SEC’s past use 
of the term.95  In many respects, the entire Goldstein matter, and the fate 
of the Rule, would turn on the meaning of a single word. 
The Goldstein court identified past instances of SEC interpretations 
of the term “client” that substantially undermined the government’s 
theory of the case.96  The court also noted that hedge fund managers 
 92. Id. at 3 (quoting Investment Advisers Act Release No. 956 (Feb. 22, 1985), 50 
Fed. Reg. 8740, 8741 (Mar. 5, 1985) (JA 001, 002)). 
 93. The SEC correctly noted in its Final Brief that the discussion in Lowe regarding 
‘personalized’ versus ‘impersonal’ advice, however, is solely for the purposes of 
determining which type of publishers fall within the definition of an investment adviser.  
See SEC’s Appell. Brief, supra note 5, at 17 and 34-37; § 202(a)(11) of the Advisers 
Act (defining “investment adviser” as “one who ‘engages in the business of advising 
others, either directly or through publications or writings.’”) (citing Lowe, 472 U.S. at 
188-89 (1985)). 
 94. See SEC’s Appell. Brief, supra note 5, at 38-39.  The Goldstein petitioners 
contended the interpretation of the term “client” within Lowe v. SEC should govern the 
analysis of the challenged Rule: 
Once it is established that an adviser – such as petitioner Kimball & Winthrop here – 
directly manages a number of investors’ assets sufficient to render it an ‘investment 
adviser’ under the Act, Lowe does not direct how to determine who is the adviser’s 
“client” for any purpose . . . .  Lowe does not dictate that the adviser’s “clients” are 
only those who have a person-to-person relationship with the adviser.  It is therefore 
entirely consistent with Lowe to conclude that, with respect to “private funds,” each 
investor (often a limited [partner] in a fund organized as a limited partnership), who is 
receiving the same asset management services from the adviser, can be considered the 
adviser’s “client” for purposes of the Section 203(b)(3) private adviser exemption. 
Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 95. Goldstein Opening Brief, supra note 79, at 17 (citing Advisers Act Release No. 
983, Definition of “client” of Investment Adviser for Certain Purposes Relating to 
Limited Partnerships, 50 Fed. Reg. 29, 206 (July 18, 1985)). 
 96. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 876 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing 17 C.F.R. 
§ 275.203(b)(3)-1) (“[T]he Commission has interpreted this provision to refer to the 
partnership or entity itself as the adviser’s ‘client.’”); see Giselle Abramovich, Judges 
Grill SEC over Hedge Fund Rule, MONEY MGMT. EXECUTIVE., Dec. 12, 2005, available 
at http://www.financial-planning.com/pubs/fpi/20051212101.html (last visited Dec. 3, 
2006) (stating that during oral arguments in Goldstein, Circuit Judge Harry Edwards 
told the defendant SEC, “You can’t just come in here and say we’re going to make 
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“usually satisfy the ‘private adviser exemption,’”97 and with regard to 
the contested definition of “investment adviser,” stated: 
Hedge fund general partners meet the definition of “investment 
adviser” in the Advisers Act (defining “investment adviser” as one 
who “for compensation, engages in the business of advising others, 
either directly or through publications or writings, as to the value of 
securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or 
selling securities. . . .”).98
1. Whom Does an Adviser Advise? 
The Goldstein court placed little weight on the fact that authority it 
cited, Abrahamson v. Fleschner, had stated that limited partner investors 
did receive investment advice from a general partner in its first 
circulated opinion, but that language was redacted from a subsequent 
version of the opinion.99  The SEC highlighted in its brief the language 
redacted from the Abrahamson opinion to no avail.100  By negative 
inference, one could presumably surmise that the Second Circuit found 
that, at least in its first version of the Abrahamson opinion, limited 
partner beneficial owners were recipients of an adviser’s advice, a key 
factual criterion for determining whether an investor is a “client,” and 
whether a hedge fund adviser might qualify for the “private adviser” 
exemption. 
Mr. Goldstein did not volunteer to the court that certain investors in 
his hedge funds had “different investment objectives and varying 
degrees of control of the funds in their brokerage accounts,” and that 
 
‘client’ mean whatever we want because we’re the [SEC] . . . .  We have to test your 
thesis and your thesis doesn’t stand up.”).  Id. 
 97. Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 876 (citing Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d at 869-
71 (2d Cir. 1977)) (emphasis added) (holding that hedge fund general partners are 
“investment advisers”), overruled in part on other grounds by Transamerica Mortgage 
Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979). 
 98. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 876 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing Abrahamson v. 
Fleschner, 568 F.2d at 869-71 (2d Cir. 1977)) (internal citation omitted). 
 99. See SEC’s Appell. Brief, supra note 5, at 23 n.7; Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 878-79 
(citing Abrahamson, 568 F.2d at 871 n.16) (“The final published opinion omits those 
four words [‘to the limited partners’] suggesting that the court expressly declined to 
resolve any ambiguity in the term “client.”  If – as we generally assume – Congress was 
aware of this judicial confusion.”)  (emphasis added).  Id. 
 100. See SEC’s Appell. Brief, supra note 5, at 23 n.7. 
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some of those investors had testified that they actually consulted with 
him regarding the funds’ investments, and even expected him to 
consider their advice as it related to the funds’ investment decisions.101  
It seems that those individual investors had highly personalized needs 
and objectives, consistent with the term “client,” despite its purportedly  
“universally accepted” meaning.102  This “universally accepted” 
terminology, at least according to the Goldstein petitioners’ contention,  
was perhaps something upon which reasonable minds could conceivably 
disagree, when one considers the findings of the court in Phillip 
Goldstein v. Lincoln Nat’l Convertible Securities Fund, Inc.  The 
omission of the prior testimony of these investors is conspicuous, 
irrespective of whether the term “client” is in fact “universally 
accepted.” 
Despite the omission, the unanimous Goldstein court was 
apparently persuaded by the petitioners’ theory, presumably in no small 
part because of the examples cited of the Commission’s prior use of 
“client” that were consistent with Goldstein’s argument.  The court 
construed the meaning of “client” in accordance with the petitioners’ 
position, despite noting that, “the Investment Advisers Act of 
 101. Phillip Goldstein v. Lincoln Nat’l Convertible Securities Fund, Inc., Case No. 
00-2653, Memorandum and Order (E.D. Pa. Apr. 27, 2001), available at 
http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents /opinions/01D0329P.pdf (last visited Dec. 19, 
2006).  This unrelated civil matter is revealing in terms of who Goldstein may have 
directly advised: 
¶ 47.  Goldstein provided investment advice and money management services to 
family, friends and four clients—Opportunity Partners, Mercury Partners, LP 
(“Mercury Partners”), Calapasas Investment Partnership (“Calapasas”), and Jasso, Inc. 
(“Jasso”).  Transcript at 115–22 (testimony of Phillip Goldstein, Apr. 16, 2001). 
¶ 48.  All of the persons or entities to whom plaintiff offered investment advice and 
money management services had different investment objectives and varying degrees 
of control of the funds in their brokerage accounts over which Goldstein had 
discretionary trading authority; Id. at 53 (testimony of Glenn Goodstein, Apr. 18, 
2001) (testifying that decisions as to which securities were bought and sold for 
Mercury Partners were made jointly by himself and Goldstein); Id. at 65 (testimony of 
Jeff Robertson, Apr. 18, 2001) (testifying that he monitored all trades made on behalf 
of Calapasas by Goldstein). 
¶ 49. Glenn Goodstein of Mercury Partners, Jeff Robertson of Calapasas, and Jaime 
Sohacheski of Jasso, all regularly discussed their investment strategies with 
Goldstein. They expected Goldstein to follow their advice on investing their funds.  Id. 
at 55–56 (testimony of Glenn Goodstein, Apr. 18, 2001); Id. at 66 (testimony of Jeff 
Robertson, Apr. 18, 2001); and Id. 78–79 (testimony of Jaime Sohacheski, Apr. 18, 
2001). 
Id. (internal citations and numbered paragraphs in original) (emphasis added). 
 102. See Goldstein Complaint, supra note 15, at ¶ 24 
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1940, . . . a companion statute to the Investment Company Act of 1940, 
and the statute which primarily concerns us in this case [was] [e]nacted 
by Congress to ‘substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the 
philosophy of caveat emptor’ in the investment advisory profession.”103  
While the court was so exacting about the parsing of the word “client,” it 
was apparently far more flexible with the meaning of other words and 
phrases. 
Fortunately for the Goldstein camp, the issue for debate was not the 
parsing of the meaning of the phrase “hedge fund,” as it is not even 
mentioned anywhere in the federal securities laws.104  Just as fortunate 
for petitioners was that the debate did not focus upon the meaning of 
“full disclosure,” as it might well be considered “universally accepted” 
that the word “full” is understood to mean: entire, complete, all, 
maximum, absolute, or without exception.105  Here, however, at least 
within the context of an Advisers Act analysis of the “private adviser” 
exemption eligibility, “full” usually means something considerably 
closer to “half.”106
Perhaps foreclosing the ability of the SEC to examine hedge fund 
advisers books and records was the real underlying motivation for Wall 
Street in general, and Mr. Goldstein in particular, to attack the Rule?107  
 103. Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 876 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing SEC v. Capital 
Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)) (citations omitted) (emphasis 
added). 
 104. Id. at 874-7, citing comments of David A. Vaughan, SEC Roundtable on Hedge 
Funds (May 13, 2003), available at http:// www.sec.gov/spotlight/hedgefunds/hedge-
vaughn.htm (citing fourteen different definitions found in government and industry 
publications) (“‘Hedge funds’ are notoriously difficult to define.  The term [“hedge 
fund”] appears nowhere in the federal securities laws, and even industry participants do 
not agree upon a single definition.”) (emphasis added). 
 105. See e.g., www.dictionary.com for definition of “full,” 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/full (last visited Dec 27, 2006). 
 106. See Goldstein Complaint, supra note 15, at ¶ 25 (explaining that 
“approximately half of the advisors to large hedge fends [sic] are currently registered”) 
(emphasis added); see Goldstein, 451 F.3d at 876 (stating that hedge fund partners 
“usually satisfy the ‘private adviser exemption’ from registration in § 203(b)(3) of the 
Act.”) (emphasis added). 
 107. Norman B. Arnoff & Sue C. Jacobs, Professional Liability: The Brandeis 
Rules, N.Y.L.J 3, at 3 (Oct. 24, 2006).  Arnoff & Jacob’s view of securities regulation 
promotes a continuum of interrelated functions: 
It is not merely enough for the aspiration to be stated that the highest standards should 
prevail, but that these standards have to be given meaningful content with clear notice 
to those professionals for which the standards apply.  The starting and succeeding 
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Some commentators have identified the significance of the so-called 
“Hedge Fund Rule,” as it related to Justice Brandeis’s maxim that 
sunlight is the “best of disinfectants.”108  Those critics have also 
correctly observed that “professionalism in the securities and financial 
services industries will not be meaningfully and effectively developed 
by the SEC and other regulators if their ability to inspect a significant 
number of investment advisers is curtailed.”109  The interpretive weight 
of Lowe apparently led the Goldstein court to confront the SEC’s 
incongruent usage of “client” and “negate[] a rule that merely created a 
framework for regulatory oversight and upheld the longstanding secrecy 
of hedge funds and their advisers without reference to sound policy 
[and] did so in part on the basis of sophistic linguistic analyses.”110  The 
SEC’s unfortunately inconsistent use of a single word proved to be 
sufficient to deem the Rule arbitrary, and with that cornerstone removed, 
dismantling of the Rule was almost inevitable. 
 
2. The Absence of Any Fiduciary Duty Analysis by  
Goldstein and the D.C. Circuit Court 
The Goldstein court’s almost singular focus on whether one had 
received “personalized advice” as a “client” seemingly ignored the 
analytical significance of the concept of fiduciary duty, prominent 
throughout U.S. securities law doctrine.111  The apparent lack of any 
 
points are SEC registration, periodic compliance inspections, pragmatic rule-making 
and, in the last instance, SEC enforcement investigations and proceedings when risks 
to public investors have not already been abated nor wrongs corrected. 
Id. 
 108. See id. at 1; see also L. Brandeis, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY 62 (Natl. Home 
Library Found. ed. 1933).
 109. Arnoff & Jacobs, supra note 107 at 1.  Arnoff & Jacobs properly questioned the 
opacity of the hedge fund sector: 
The substantial percentage of hedge fund trading to the overall trading in our capital 
markets today mandates judicial or legislative correction.  All the Hedge Fund 
Adviser Rule did was to place in open, regulatory view the significant activity of 
hedge funds and their advisers so that the Brandeis Rule “sunlight is the best 
disinfectant,” would have its full force and effect.  Professionalism in the securities 
and financial services industries will not be meaningfully and effectively developed 
by the SEC and other regulators if their ability to inspect a significant number of 
investment advisers is curtailed. 
Id. 
 110. Id. at 3. 
 111. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (discussing fiduciary 
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measurable consideration of the fiduciary duties owed by an adviser to 
its hedge fund investors when evaluating and parsing the term “client,” 
left the court’s analysis “seriously flawed” according to at least some 
jurisprudence observers.112  The Tenth Circuit recently performed a 
“functional analysis” of the fiduciary duty owed by investment advisers 
that is in stark contrast with that of the Goldstein court’s analysis and 
decision.113
duties); see also Arnoff & Jacobs, supra note 107, at 4 (discussing Chiarella’s rule of 
law). 
[A] financial printer “was able to deduce the names of the target companies before the 
final printing from other information contained in . . . documents” and “[w]ithout 
disclosing his knowledge . . . purchased stock in the targets companies and sold the 
shares immediately after takeover attempts were made public.”  The Court reversed 
Chiarella’s criminal conviction in the absence of a relationship that created a fiduciary 
obligation).  The Chiarella Court held: 
Not every instance of financial unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity under § 
10(b) . . . [t]he element required to make silence fraudulent—a duty to disclose—is 
absent in this case.  No duty could arise from . . . [the printer’s] relationship with the 
sellers of the target company’s securities, for . . . [the printer] had no prior dealing 
with them.  He was not their agent, he was not a fiduciary, he was not a person in 
whom the sellers had placed their trust and confidence.  He was, in fact, a complete 
stranger who dealt with the sellers only through impersonal market transactions. 
When there is a relationship between the parties and not merely “impersonal market 
transactions” but a degree of dependency, the law is expansive in order to create and 
enforce fiduciary obligations. 
Arnoff & Jacobs, supra note 107, at 4 (citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 
(1980)). 
 112. See Arnoff & Jacobs, supra note 107, at 3.  Arnoff & Jacobs noted the 
conspicuous absence of any discussion of fiduciary duty within the Goldstein opinion: 
[T]he [Goldstein] court’s analysis is seriously flawed because it does not give 
recognition to the fundamental proposition and wisdom that an investment manager 
has fiduciary responsibility to the individual investor and his or her clientele because 
the adviser-manager has care, custody, and control of the funds and securities of 
others.  The statement that “(i)f investors are owed a fiduciary duty and the entity is 
also owed a fiduciary duty, the adviser will eventually face conflicts of interest” is 
also too simplistic in that it does not allow for the distinction between voidable and 
nonvoidable conflicts, as well as a proactive SEC that, inter alia, by reason of its 
essential inspection process will learn enough of the current pitfalls of the practices 
and procedures of investment adviser firms to be able by enlightened rule-making to 
correct the problems [sic]. 
Id. 
 113. See id. at 6.  Recent Tenth Circuit analysis differs greatly from that of the 
Goldstein court in terms of the relevance of fiduciary duty considerations and the ability 
of the SEC to regulate the U.S. capital markets: 
[“A]n agent is a fiduciary with respect to matters within the scope of his agency.”  
The firm, which had dual registration as a broker-dealer and an investment adviser, 
failed to disclose the true facts and deceived clients that they were acting as a 
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Hedge fund advisers receive the “highest degree of trust and 
confidence in regard to the care, custody and control of other people’s 
funds and securities.”114  An adviser owes its investors a fiduciary duty, 
and if an adviser, for example, participates in an activity known as 
“scalping,”115 it breaches that duty owed to its investors.116  
Accordingly, the Investment Company Act specifically contemplated 
and imposed fiduciary duties upon advisers that are owed to both the 
investment company and its investors.117  The Supreme Court has also 
contemplated the fiduciary duties owed to investors and customers in the 
context of whether an investment account or the investment of capital is 
deemed to be on a discretionary or non-discretionary basis.118  There can 
principal and the differential between the client’s price on a principal versus an 
agency trade. The firm held itself out to its clients as a fiduciary and was held to that 
standard. Most significantly, for this analysis and the conclusions to be drawn, is that 
there were serious record-keeping deficiencies . . . [that] detrimentally affected 
the . . . [SEC’s] ability to assemble the requisite evidence in . . . [the] case. 
Id. (quoting the “functional analysis” in German v. SEC, 334 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 
2003)). 
 114. Id. at 3. 
 115. Id. (citing SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963)).  
Form may have prevailed over function in terms of the parsing of “client” without a 
detailed analysis of fiduciary duty: 
The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed fiduciary duty issues in the investment adviser 
context.  In SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc. et al., a registered investment 
adviser engaged in the practice of purchasing shares of a security for his account 
before he placed the trades for his clients.  He did not disclose these transactions or 
practices to his clients and, nonetheless, recommended the security for long-term 
investment for the client while immediately reselling for a profit on a market upswing.  
This practice has come to be known as “scalping” and the antithesis of the legislative 
intent of the Investment Adviser Act of 1940. 
Id.  (emphasis added). 
 116. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963) 
(explaining that scalping is a mechanism for fraud or deceit upon any client or 
prospective client within the meaning of the Investment Advisors Act). 
 117. See Advisers Act, supra note 14. 
 118. Cf. De Kwiatkowski v. Bear Stearns, 306 F.3d 1293 (2d Cir. 2002) (stating no 
fiduciary duty owed to brokerage client for advice where client holds a non-
discretionary account with broker); see Arnoff & Jacobs, supra note 107 (“[T]he core 
element of fiduciary duty is not the closest degree of privity but the dependency of 
client-investors upon a relationship of trust and confidence that may have been created 
by other contracting parties.”).  The Second Circuit’s analysis of a client dependent 
upon a broker managing a discretionary account was apparently not addressed by the 
Goldstein court: 
The transformative “special circumstances” recognized in the cases are circumstances 
that render the client dependent—a client who has impaired faculties, or one who has 
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be little debate that a hedge fund adviser has full investment discretion 
over the capital under management and owes its investors fiduciary 
duties. 
The Goldstein court almost effortlessly dispensed with (or at least 
profoundly discounted) the core concept of fiduciary duty in its analysis.  
The court did, however, consider conflicts of interest as part of its 
analysis and compared the hedge fund adviser-investor relationship with 
the relationship of an issuer’s attorney and its common shareholders and 
stated, “if the investors are owed a fiduciary duty and the entity is also 
owed a fiduciary duty, then the adviser will inevitably face conflicts of 
interest.”119  The Goldstein court apparently did not, however, evaluate 
the more relevant and analogous relationship between a common 
shareholder and an issuer company’s officers and directors.  As 
management of an issuer company, officers and directors are 
functionally equivalent to a hedge fund manager-adviser as it relates to 
the fund’s investors, and owe similar fiduciary duties to the issuer’s 
shareholders, concurrent with fiduciary duties owed to the company, 
despite scenarios where conflicts of interest might arise.120
There can be little doubt that when an investor provides capital to 
Phillip Goldstein for investment in one of his “Bulldog Investors” hedge 
funds, Mr. Goldstein is implicitly (and perhaps expressly by contract) 
empowered with the discretion to invest that capital; to launch his many 
proxy battles as part of some perceived “value investing” theorem; and 
a closer than arm’s-length relationship with the broker, or one who is so lacking in 
sophistication that de facto control of the account is deemed to rest in the broker.  The 
law thus imposes additional extra-contractual duties, on brokers who can take unfair 
advantage of their customers’ incapacity or simplicity . . . .  [In] absence of an express 
advisory contract, there is no fiduciary duty on the part of . . . [the] broker dealer 
“unless the customer is infirm or ignorant of business affairs.” 
See Arnoff & Jacobs, supra note 107. 
 119. See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 881 (D.C. Cir. 2006).  The court 
addressed conflicts in the context of an issuer’s outside  “gatekeepers,” but not those 
inherent in managerial relations between directors, issues and shareholders. 
Consider an investment adviser to a hedge fund that is about to go bankrupt. His 
advice to the fund will likely include any and all measures to remain solvent.  His 
advice to an investor in the fund, however, would likely be to sell.  For the same 
reason, we do not ordinarily deem the shareholders in a corporation the “clients” of 
the corporation’s lawyers or accountants. 
Id. 
 120. U.S. v. Brown, 459 F.3d 509, 533 (5th Cir. 2006) (Reavley, J., dissenting) 
(“Enron executives are not Enron itself and, in any event, they owed a fiduciary duty to 
Enron and its shareholders.”) (emphasis in original). 
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to even install his “Bulldog” confederates on whatever corporate boards 
he has successfully infiltrated through his funds’ investments.121  Mr. 
 121. See RMR Hospitality and Real Estate Fund Form 8-K, Nov. 13, 2006, 
Commission File No. 811-21502, http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1278038/ 
000110465906076852/a06-23938_48k.htm#scotch (last visited Dec. 1, 2006) (stating 
allegations pursued by RMR is a closed end mutual fund and a registered investment 
company against Bulldog for violations of share ownership limitation and its trust 
agreement); RMR Ex. 99.1 to Nov. 13, 2006 8K, at 1, http://www.sec.gov 
/Archives/edgar/data/1278038/0001104659060 76852/a06-23938_4ex99d1.htm (last 
visited Dec. 1, 2006); RMR Ex.99.1 (to Nov. 13, 2006 8K), Compl. at 2 (stating 
Bulldog’s practices of putting pressure on management after acquiring a significant 
percentage of ownership, abandoning the company in a weak state and often threatens 
expensive litigation) [hereinafter RHR Complaint]; Proxy Statement of Bulldog 
Investors General Partnership and Karpus Management Stockholders of Seligman 
Quality Municipal Fund, Inc., DEFC14A, Sept. 26, 2006, http://www.sec.gov 
/Archives/edgar/data/862813/000136477306000010/sqfdefproxy.txt (last visited Dec. 8, 
2006) (explaining a proposal by “Bulldog” to submit for a new slate of board of 
directors); Definitive Proxy Statement Relating to Merger or Acquisition [sic], filed by 
Hector Communications Corp., DEFM14A, Sept. 1, 2006, http://www.sec.gov/ 
Archives/edgar/data/863437/000110465906059347/a06-17435_1de 
fm14a.htm#BackgroundOfTheMerger_010243 (last visited Dec. 3, 2006) (stating that 
Goldstein threatened to conduct a proxy contest for a new board of directors); Angela 
Pruitt, Activist Presses Closed-End Funds—Goldstein Wants Boards To Reconcile 
Discounts With Net Asset Values, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 2005.  Numerous issues have 
been the target of Mr. Goldstein’s proxy attacks, including the First Israel Fund, which 
successfully fended off his “activism”: 
Last month First Israel Fund thwarted an attack from Mr. Goldstein by nominating 
him to a seat on its board. Emerging Markets Telecommunications Fund also elected 
Mr. Goldstein to its board after he raised concerns about the fund’s discount and 
valuation of its investments. 
“While I’m a good investor, I’m really a better shareholder activist,” said Mr. 
Goldstein, who was an individual investor for many years before he began managing 
money professionally 13 years ago. 
Mr. Goldstein has a go-for-the-jugular style. In a Securities and Exchange 
Commission filing in February, he likened New Germany Fund’s board to the 
deposed Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, arguing the fund was “disenfranchising” 
shareholders. 
Robert Wadsworth, a director of New Germany Fund, said Mr. Goldstein looks out 
only for his self-interest and not other stockholders. “He is an arbitrageur,” he said. 
“The problem is that, if you’re a member of the fund board, you have to figure out 
what all of the shareholders want,” Mr. Wadsworth said.  “I try to focus on the 
interests of the long-term shareholders, not just those [like Mr. Goldstein] who are 
trying to get in and out and make a quick buck.” 
Id.; cf., Millennium Media Consulting: Highlights From Fall 2006 Market Outlook & 
Investment Press Briefing, MARKET WIRE (Press Release), Oct. 31, 2006, available at 
http://www.marketwire.com/mw/ release_html_b1?release_id=178864 (last visited Dec. 
3, 2006).  Mr. Goldstein commented that: 
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Goldstein publicly acknowledged that he owes fiduciary duties to his 
investors, but not surprisingly, just as the term “hedge fund” is not 
mentioned anywhere in the federal securities laws, the core concept of 
fiduciary duty was altogether absent from the Goldstein petitioners’ 
pleadings.122  One can only surmise why a unanimous circuit court did 
not evaluate the issue of fiduciary duty in the hedge fund context, 
especially when the regulatory stakes were so high.  Perhaps it was so 
persuaded by the inconsistencies of the SEC’s past interpretation of the 
word “client,” that it viewed further analysis to be unnecessary. 
 
 
The typical value investor will buy a stock for 50% of its intrinsic value and wait for a 
catalyst.  Trouble is, some stocks are still cheap 10 years later . . . .  Maximizing 
shareholder value can take awhile, but it shouldn’t take forever.  I believe a corporate 
director has a fiduciary responsibility to do something if a stock trades at a persistent 
discount to its intrinsic value. 
Id. 
 122. See generally Goldstein Complaint, supra note 15 (providing no reference to 
fiduciary duty).  But see Lori Pizzani, Hedge Fund to Challenge SEC, Again: Denial of 
13f Regulatory Exemption to Prompt New Lawsuit, MONEY MGMT. EXECUTIVE, Sept. 
18, 2006, available at http://www.accessmylibrary.com/comsite5/bin/comsite5.pl? 
page=library&item_id=0286-17695792 (last visited Dec. 3, 2006) (quoting Phillip 
Goldstein) (“Just as we [as activist shareholders] don’t tolerate management abusing 
shareholders, I don’t think any citizen should tolerate a Federal agency abusing its 
authority.  We have good investment ideas, and we don’t want them publicly out there.  
I have a fiduciary responsibility to [my] investors.”); Millennium Media Consulting: 
Highlights From Fall 2006 Market Outlook & Investment Press Briefing, MARKET 
WIRE, Oct. 31, 2006, available at http://www.marketwire.com/mw/release_html_b1 
?release_id=178864 (last visited Dec. 3, 2006).  Mr. Goldstein has publicly 
acknowledged the importance of fiduciary duty with respect to the management of his 
hedge funds: 
Acting within your fiduciary duty often means pressing for the sale of a company in 
order to maximize shareholder value, fighting to open-end a closed-end fund trading 
at a persistent discount or even challenging securities regulators when a rule makes no 
sense, said shareholder activist and hedge fund manager Phillip Goldstein, partner 
with Saddle Brook, N.J.-based Bulldog Investors. 
Id.; Angela Pruitt, Activist Presses Closed-End Funds—Goldstein Wants Boards To 
Reconcile Discounts With Net Asset, WALL ST. J., April 5, 2005.  The article stated that: 
Mr. Goldstein doesn’t deny that making money is his ultimate goal, but he says his 
activism helps shareholders.  “It’s true that I have an interest and fiduciary duty to my 
own investors to try to make them money,” said Mr.  Goldstein. “If I can do that in an 
honest, ethical way by being an activist, I think I should do that.” 
Id. 
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B. The Commission’s Stated Bases for Adoption of the Registration Rule 
The SEC specifically noted that it adopted the Rule, “in response to 
(i) a dramatic growth in hedge funds and the impact on markets of 
trading by hedge fund advisers, (ii) an increase in fraud involving hedge 
fund advisers, and (iii) the broader exposure of smaller non-traditional 
hedge fund investors to the risks of hedge fund investing.”123  Not 
surprisingly, the Goldstein petitioners took almost mocking issue with 
each of the SEC’s stated reasons, and suggested the bases were non-
starters or even dubious for lack of any proffered evidence by the 
SEC.124 The Goldstein petitioners also relied heavily on the 1999 
President’s Working Group Report (“PWG”)125 to refute the SEC’s cited 
rationale.  The petitioners failed to acknowledge, however, that the 
primary focus of the PWG was the international banking system,126 and 
that the PWG “was not entrusted with protecting investors or the 
securities markets, [or that] much has changed in the hedge fund 
 
 123. See SEC’s Appell. Brief, supra note 5, at 4-5.  The SEC contended that its 
regulatory framework was a benign measure that merely closed a loophole: 
The rule and rule amendments close a “loophole,” which has arisen under the 
Commission’s [1985] safe harbor, allowing hedge fund advisers to avoid registration 
in situations where the assets of hedge fund investors are managed similarly (or in 
many instances identically) to the manner in which a registered adviser manages the 
assets of clients who directly open accounts with the adviser. . . .  Not only do the rule 
and rule amendments close this loophole but they do so . . . without imposing burdens 
on the legitimate investment activities of hedge funds. 
Id. (emphasis in original).  The SEC also noted in its brief that, “some hedge funds may 
offer investors different levels of access to risk and portfolio information, different 
lock-up periods, and different fee amounts,” and found evidence of “side pocket” 
arrangements, in which a particular set of assets is segregated to provide different 
investors with distinct investment experiences.  Id. at 43-44 (citing Carrick Mollencamp 
and David Reilly, Tracking the Numbers/Street Sleuth: Some Big Investors Get to Use 
the Side Door – During Hedge Fund Boom, Not Everyone Is Equal, WALL ST. J., Mar. 
14, 2005, p. C1) (citing the “widespread existence of ‘side letters’ in the [hedge fund] 
industry”). 
 124. See Goldstein Complaint, supra note 15, at ¶ 34 (stating that there was a lack of 
evidence of fraud in hedge funds in the industry). 
 125. See generally Report of the President’s Working Group (“PWG”) on Financial 
Markets, Hedge Funds, Leverage, and the Lessons of Long-Term Capital Management, 
Apr. 1999, available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/hedgfund.pdf (last 
visited April 24, 2007). 
 126. See SEC’s Appell. Brief, supra note 5, at 18 (stating that the Working Group 
was not entrusted with protecting investors or the securities markets). 
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industry and the market impact of hedge fund advisers since 1999.”127
1. Future Seismic Shifts and Financial System Fissures 
The Goldstein court observed that “the current push” for a revised 
hedge fund regulatory regime finds “its origins in the failure of Long-
Term Capital Management [“LTCM”], a Greenwich, Connecticut-based 
fund that had more than $125 billion in assets under management at its 
peak.  In late 1998, the LTCM fund nearly collapsed.”128  Certainly one 
could appreciate that the unexpected implosion of one of the world’s 
largest private capital pools might be a matter of grave concern.  
Nonetheless, the court further observed that with regard to the LTCM 
debacle, “[a]lmost all of the country’s major financial institutions were 
put at risk due to their credit exposure to Long-Term, and the president 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York personally intervened to 
engineer a bailout of the fund in order to avoid a national financial 
crisis.”129  While it is highly unlikely that the prophylactic registration 
requirements of the so-called “Hedge Fund Rule” could have prevented 
“a group of elite investors who . . . believed they could beat the market 
and like alchemists, create limitless wealth for themselves and their 
partners, [who] in fact created a trillion-dollar hole in the international 
banking system,”130 the risk of systemic damage from a major hedge 
collapse may still lurk beneath the market’s surface today.  Moreover, to 
consciously ignore such potential systemic and catastrophic financial 
risk might be perceived as something akin to the mythical Major T. J. 
“King” Kong’s fateful cinematic fall from the sky.131
 
 127. See id. at 18, 48 (“[T]he Commission [wa]s the only member of the [1999 
President’s] Working Group entrusted with the role of protecting investors and 
overseeing the nation’s securities markets.”). 
 128. See Goldstein v. SEC 451 F.3d 873, 877 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 129. Id. (citing ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF 
LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT – HOW ONE SMALL BANK CREATED A TRILLION-
DOLLAR HOLE (Hardback ed. 2001)). 
 130. LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED (Paperback ed. 2002); see Evan-Pritchard, 
supra note 35; see also, e.g., Jody Shenn and Yalman Onaran, Bear Stearns Plans $3.2 
Billion Hedge Fund Bailout (Update4), REUTERS, June 22, 2007, available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=amZ.IeL2pJHo&refer=ho
me (last visited June 25, 2007). (“Bear Stearns Cos. offered $3.2 billion in loans to bail 
out one of its failing hedge funds, the biggest rescue since 1998, after creditors started 
seizing assets and investors demanded their money back.”). 
 131. DR. STRANGELOVE, OR: HOW I LEARNED TO STOP WORRYING AND LOVE THE 
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2. Proliferation of Hedge Frauds 
The Goldstein pleadings scoffed at the amount of securities fraud 
that has been discovered in the last decade with alleged connections to 
hedge fund trading activities, and rationalized that any degree of hedge 
fund fraud is proportionate and therefore requires no prophylactic 
regulatory measures.132  The Goldstein camp sought to marginalize this 
issue by pointing to the existing anti-fraud provisions of the Advisers 
Act, which largely addresses fraud retrospectively.133  It also called 
attention to the absence of any proffered evidence of hedge fraud in the 
Rule’s Proposing Release, and cited the PWG report for support that 
there was no evidence indicating that hedge funds or their advisers 
engage disproportionately in fraudulent activity.134  The Goldstein 
petitioners, however, cited no support whatsoever for the implied 
premise that the SEC was somehow required to proffer evidence as a 
prerequisite to its adoption of the Rule. 
Mr. Goldstein’s theory also seemingly shrugged off scores of recent 
enforcement actions brought by the SEC against hedge funds, alleging 
an array of fraudulent activities.135  There can be little doubt that hedge 
 
BOMB (Columbia Pictures 1964), available at http://www.filmsite.org/drst.html (last 
visited Dec. 2, 2006). 
 132. See Goldstein Complaint, supra note 15, at ¶ 34 (emphasis added). 
 133. See id. 
 134. See id. (emphasis added). 
 135. See, e.g., In re Banc One Inv. Advisors Corp., Advisers Act Release No. 2254 
(June 29, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/ia-2254.htm (last 
visited Feb. 25, 2007) [hereinafter Market Timing] (Commission found that investment 
adviser permitted Canary hedge fund manager Edward Stern to time the adviser’s 
mutual funds, contrary to the funds’ prospectuses; helped arrange financing for the 
timing trades; failed to disclose the timing arrangements; and provided Stern with 
nonpublic portfolio information); see Investment Adviser Registration Final Rule, supra 
note 45, at 72,057 n.29; see SEC press release, SEC Announces $38 Million Fair Fund 
Distribution in the Veras Hedge Funds Settlement, Mar. 21, 2007, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-50.htm  (last visited Mar. 25, 2007); SEC v. 
Sec. Trust Co., N.A., Litigation Release No. 18,653 (Apr. 1, 2004) [hereinafter Late 
Trading] (consent to judgment by trust company charged with facilitating late trades 
and market timing by affiliated hedge funds over at least a three-year period), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18653.htm (Mar. 26, 2007); Securities and 
Exchange Commission v. Michael Lauer, Case No. 03-80612-CIV-ZLOCH (S.D. Fla., 
filed July 8, 2003) [hereinafter Market Manipulation] (“Specifically, the Complaint 
alleges that the defendants systematically manipulated the month end closing prices of 
certain securities held by the Funds to overstate the value of the Funds’ holdings in 
virtually worthless companies.”); SEC Litigation Release No. 18,247, July 23, 2003, 
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fraud exists every trading day, in a wide variety of schemes, including 
market timing, late trading, insider trading, abusive short sales, market 
manipulation, and a host of other deceptive (and illegal) practices.136  
The question of whether adviser registration can predict or prevent any 
of these activities is certainly fair, but at a minimum, it seems reasonable 
to conclude that the overall regulatory regime contemplated by the 
vacated Rule did reduce the frequency and scope of such misconduct, or 
at least increase the likelihood of detection.137
Reported hedge fund related fraud has been a growing source of 
concern for securities regulators.  Alleged fraudulent trading by hedge 
funds reportedly constitutes roughly eleven percent of all recent SEC 
available at http://sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18247.htm (last visited Dec. 4, 2006); 
see also Paul Tharp, Senate Raises Heat on Funds in Panel Grilling, N.Y. POST, Dec. 6, 
2006, available at http://www.nypost.com/seven/12062006/business/senate_raises_heat 
_on_funds_in_panel_grilling_business_paul_tharp.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2007) 
(“Wall Street is stacked tighter than ever against the little guy because secret investment 
pools that operate freely outside securities laws can actually rig stock trading, according 
to Senate testimony.”); Jenny Anderson, Hedge Funds Draw Insider Scrutiny, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 16, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/16/business/ 
16hedge.html; Alex Brummer, Discipline for a false market, DAILYMAIL (U.K.), Mar. 
30, 2007, available at http://www.thisismoney.co.uk/news/columnists/article.html? 
in_article_id=418948&in_page_id=19&in_author_id=1 (last visited Mar. 30, 2007) 
(“We know from the FSA’s [the U.K. Financial Services Authority] survey released 
earlier this month that in 2005 almost a quarter of announced deals were preceded by 
insider trading.”) (emphasis added); Katherine Burton and David Scheer, Sandell Asset 
Management Draws SEC Scrutiny for Short Sales, BLOOMBERG.COM, Oct. 31, 2006, 
available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20670001&refer=funds&sid=a 
JoinHyJ.iyQ (last visited Feb. 25, 2007). 
 136. Id. 
 137. For example, the SEC examination powers and the books and records 
provisions within the Rule certainly appeared to have the potential to serve as effective 
measures to uncover fraudulent activity, and the prospect of an SEC inspection seems to 
intuitively establish a strong deterrent for the avoidance of misconduct.  But see speech, 
supra note 35.  Commissioner Atkins remarked that it is “wishful thinking” to believe 
the Rule would have effectively detected hedge funds engaging in securities fraud: 
Needless to say, we did not find the late trading and market timing problems through 
our examinations of any of the many registered funds, registered advisors, and 
registered broker-dealers that were at fault.  And, those who claim that hedge fund 
registration would have led us to discover the fraud through examination are engaging 
in wishful thinking.  They don’t understand the craftiness of people who engage in 
illicit activities. As we do now, we will have to rely heavily on disgruntled investors, 
former employees, and suspicious third parties, such as a prime broker, to alert us to 
problems. 
Id. 
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insider trading enforcement actions, a figure that does not include frauds 
already perpetrated but still under investigation, nor those that have 
eluded detection.138  The SEC enforcement data arguably suggests a 
disproportionate degree of hedge fund fraud exists that potentially casts 
a menacing shadow.139  Recently reported Senate Committee testimony 
asserted that “hedge funds routinely break securities laws and can harm 
smaller investors with massive insider trading that blindsides and wrecks 
ordinary investors.”140  Even if Mr. Goldstein’s theory of proportional 
fraud was valid, it does not adequately explain why such a large 
component of the U.S. capital markets should be permitted to operate so 
furtively, or how that is in any way consistent with the philosophy of 
full disclosure. 
3. Red Ink Risks For Retail Investors 
Among the significant changes in the recent hedge fund landscape 
has been the increasing trend of hedge fund “retailization.”141  The 
Goldstein pleadings rebutted the findings of “retailization” in the 2003 
SEC Staff Report142 based upon the 1999 PWG findings.143  
 
 138. Jesse Westbrook and Otis Bildeau, U.S. Insider Trading Bill Takes Aim At 
Hedge Funds, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 23, 2006, http://www.iht.com/articles/ 
2006/11/23/business/hedge.php (last visited Jan 31, 2007) (“Lawsuits involving hedge 
funds made up 11 percent of the SEC’s insider trading cases in fiscal 2006, according to 
agency figures.”). 
 139. See SEC’s Appell. Brief, supra note 5, at 47-48 n.1 (“[T]he Commission found 
that things had changed since the Working Group’s report was issued in 1999:  ‘the size 
of the hedge fund industry has doubled, the exposure of investors to hedge funds has 
broadened, and the incidence of fraud we discover involving hedge fund advisers has 
increased.’”). 
 140. Paul Tharp, Senate Raises Heat on Funds in Panel Grilling, supra note 135 
(emphasis added) (“Witnesses at a Senate panel took turns yesterday bashing the 
expanding reach of hedge funds, which now control a third of Wall Street’s trading 
action and wield more than $1.3 trillion of other people’s money—mostly cash from 
well-to-do individuals and big pension funds trying to keep retirement checks 
flowing.”). 
 141. 2003 SEC Staff Report, supra note 23. 
 142. Id. 
 143. See Goldstein Complaint, supra note 15, at ¶ 34.  The Goldstein petitioners 
sought to marginalize each and every reason the SEC asserted for its promulgation of 
the Rule, repeatedly referring to the 1999 PWG report: 
Notwithstanding “concerns” expressed in the report about fraud and “retailization” of 
hedge funds (i.e., investment in hedge funds by significant numbers of less 
sophisticated investors), the report concluded that (i) there was no evidence that fraud 
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Nonetheless, evidence of hedge fund “retailization” has continued to 
mount.  For instance, one of the more glaring recent examples is the 
nine-figure losses suffered by retirement beneficiaries of the San Diego 
county employees pension fund, directly attributable to its ill-fated 
Amaranth investment.144  Mr. Goldstein posited, perhaps at the height of 
sophistry, that pension funds are all somehow “sophisticated 
investors.”145  The unfortunate reality, despite the incredulous Goldstein 
rhetoric, is that the real Amaranth risk exposure was incurred by the 
retirement fund’s beneficiaries—municipal employees such as former 
public school teachers, police officers, firefighters, parks and recreation 
employees, trash collectors, municipal parking lot attendants, and other 
local government retirees who are entirely antithetical to the concept of 
the so-called “sophisticated investor.”146
San Diego pension fund administrators have since fired the 
consultant who recommended investing in Amaranth’s fund,147 and 
was disproportionately committed by or in hedge funds that unregistered advisers 
managed, (ii) the observed growth in hedge funds was fueled by increasing numbers 
of sophisticated investors such as pension funds, and (iii) there was no evidence of 
“retailization” in the industry. 
Id. 
 144. See, e.g., Christopher S. Rugaber, Senator Urges Hedge Fund Transparency, 
HOUSTON CHRONICLE (AP), Oct. 18, 2006, available at 
http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/printstory.mpl/ap/fn/4268516 (last visited Oct. 18, 
2006).  
[Senator Charles] Grassley (R-Iowa) said in the letter that “tens of millions of 
Americans may be unwittingly exposed to hedge fund investments” through public 
and private pension plans that invest in hedge funds. As a result, significant future 
losses at hedge funds could put many workers’ retirement security at risk, Grassley 
wrote, and could cause losses at the federal pension insurance agency, the Pension 
Benefit Guaranty Corp. 
Id.  See Jennifer McCandless, Pension Fund to Replace Advisor Post-Amaranth, 
FINANCIAL NEWS (UK), Oct. 24, 2006, available at http://www.financialnews-
us.com/?page=ushome&contentid=1045677634 (last visited Mar. 26, 2007) (“The San 
Diego County Employees Retirement Association, the Californian pension plan, is 
looking to replace the investment consultancy that recommended it put money in 
Amaranth Advisors, a move which lost the fund more than $100m (€79.6m).”). 
 145. See Goldstein Complaint, supra note 15, at ¶ 41. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Sam Hodgson, SDCERA parts ways with consultant who recommended 
Amaranth, THE DAILY TRANSCRIPT, Oct. 23, 2006, available at 
http://www.sddt.com/News/article.cfm?SourceCode=20061023czf (“The San Diego 
County Employees Retirement Association has parted ways with the consultant who 
recommended purchasing $175 million worth of shares in Amaranth—an investment 
that is now worth an estimated $70 million.”). 
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retained a high profile securities litigation firm in an attempt to recover 
at least a portion of the pension fund’s reported nine-figure Amaranth 
losses.148  Meanwhile, a massive hedge fund management firm that 
“help[ed in the] winding down of [Amaranth’s] investment portfolio” 
completed an initial public offering on February 9, 2007, and the private 
equity firm, Blackstone Group, L.P., went public on June 21, 2007, 
despite bipartisan protests from ranking legislators to postpone the $4B 
NYSE offering while Congress conducted hearings into the matter.149  
Meanwhile, as financial market and media attention was still focused on 
the Blackstone IPO, shares of Freedom Acquisition Holdings Corp., a 
little-known AMEX-listed special purpose acquisition corporation 
(“SPAC”), had inexplicably surged on aberrant volume in a declining 
broader market, and on June 25, 2007, a $3.4B reverse acquisition 
involving GLG Partners was revealed, which prompted at least one 
commentator to question the “flagrantly suspicious trading ahead of the 
announcement regarding the “regulatory-challenged London-based 
hedge fund.”150  These and other recent market developments certainly 
 148. Michael Herman, U.S. Fund Hires Lawyers To Prepare Amaranth Case, TIMES 
ONLINE (UK), Oct. 23, 2006, available at http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/ 
law/corporate/article610330.ece (last visited Feb. 24, 2007). 
 149. See Lynn Cowan, Fortress Registers for First U.S. IPO of Hedge Fund, WALL 
ST. J., Nov. 9, 2006, available at http://online.wsj.com/article_print/SB116308 
559523818612.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2006).  Fortress, now trading under the ticker 
symbol “FIG,” completed the first ever U.S. “IPO” of a hedge fund adviser: 
The company [Fortress Investment Group, LLC], which has $26 billion in assets 
under management, offers the public a rare opportunity to own an alternative 
investment manager and benefit from its hefty management fees through dividends. 
As an alternative asset manager, Fortress raises and manages private-equity funds and 
hedge funds . . . . 
Id.; see also William Hutchings, Fortress advises on Amaranth liquidation, 
FINANCIALNEWS, Oct. 2, 2006, available at http://www.financialnews-
us.com/?contentid=1045568680 (last visited Nov. 14, 2006); Michael J. de la Merced, 
Fortress Goes Public, a First for Hedge Funds Inside U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2007, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/09/business/09hedge.html (last visited 
Feb. 9, 2007).  Rachelle Younglai, SEC clears Blackstone IPO despite lawmakers' plea, 
Reuters, June 21, 2007, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/politicsNews/ 
idUSN2139935620070621 (last visited June 24, 2007).   
A last-minute plea from [Henry Waxman] a senior U.S. House of Representatives 
Democrat to delay Blackstone Group LP’s initial public offering was rejected by U.S. 
regulators on Thursday, and the IPO went ahead, eagerly grabbed up by hungry 
investors.  In making its decision, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission said 
it “rigorously applied” U.S. laws in reviewing the offering. . . .  Waxman was the fifth 
chairman of a congressional committee to express concerns or raise questions about 
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suggest that the trend towards hedge fund “retailization” is undeniable, 
and it may someday soon collide with the Second Circuit’s “special 
circumstances” doctrine first articulated in De Kwiatkowsi.151
the Blackstone IPO during the past week. 
Id. 
 150. See Freedom Acquisition Holdings, Inc., Press Release, GLG Partners to 
Access Public Markets Through Reverse Acquisition, June 25, 2007, available at 
http://www.amex.com/?href=/equities/listCmp/EqLCCmpNews.jsp?Product_Symbol=F
RH&listedYear=2007 (last visited June 25, 2007).  The British hedge fund 
characterized its reverse “SPAC” acquisition as “a Key Strategic Step in Building 
GLG’s Global Business,” and revealed its expectations of an eventual NYSE listing: 
The combined company will be named GLG Partners, Inc. Shares of the 
combined company are expected to trade on the New York Stock Exchange under the 
ticker symbol ‘GLG’ upon consummation of the transaction. GLG will also explore 
the merits of a dual listing in Europe. Based on the closing price of Freedom's shares 
on Friday, June 22, 2007, Freedom’s shareholders will own approximately 28 percent 
and current GLG equity holders will own approximately 72 percent of the combined 
company's shares on a fully diluted basis. 
Id.  See also, Greg Newton, Somebody Blabbed: Freedom Shares Jumped 8% Friday 
Ahead of GLG Reverse Acquisition, SEEKINGALPHA.COM, June 25, 2007, available at 
http://financial.seekingalpha.com/article/39308 (last visited June 25, 2007).  The snarky 
market pundit questioned the suspicious surge in Freedom Acquisition Holdings that 
occurred just one trading day before GLG’s reverse SPAC acquisition announcement: 
GLG, the hugely successful—$20 billion in assets—but regulatory-challenged 
London-based hedge fund, will slip through the backdoor to list on the New York 
Stock Exchange. Funnily enough, the shares of its reverse takeover vehicle, the 
Amex-listed SPAC (special purpose acquisition company) Freedom Acquisition 
Holdings Corp (FRH), magically gained more than 8 percent Friday, on almost 10 
times their average volume, mostly late in the day when the major indexes were 
heading off a cliff. . . . 
The flagrantly suspicious trading in FRH Friday is ironic, or perhaps even iconic. 
GLG was sanctioned by British regulators last year, and French regulators last week, 
for separate incidents of what boiled down to insider trading; GLG plans appealing 
the French ruling. 
Id.  See also, Henny Sender and Alistair MacDonald, GLG Partners  
Two-Stepping To U.S. Listing, WALL ST. J., June 25, 2007, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB118273321096046620.html (last visited June 25, 
2007) (“GLG is avoiding the hassles of an initial public offering by selling a stake 
in itself to a company that is already publicly traded. . . .  A public listing is a big 
step for GLG, which has a somewhat checkered past.”); Alexander Ferguson, GLG 
Partners to float on New York Stock Exchange via reverse takeover, FORBES (via 
THOMSON/AFX NEWS), June 25, 2007, available http://www.forbes.com/markets 
/feeds/afx/2007/06/25/afx3852586.html (last visited June 25, 2007). 
 151. For example, Goldman Sachs also recently introduced a synthetic derivative 
securities product (coined the “Absolute Return Tracker”) that apparently “seeks to 
replicate” hedge fund exposure without any minimum investment requirements or 
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IV. THE GOLDSTEIN AFTERMATH, AMARANTH, AND THE  
SEC’S SLOW AND STEADY RESPONSE 
While the SEC has used the media to press its agenda of expanded 
hedge fund regulation following the Goldstein aftermath,152 the 
Commission now appears to have adopted a slower and more cautious 
gait on this path, allowing “more time to review their language.”  As its 
cautious deliberations continue, the SEC has not yet reached any 
conclusive determinations regarding the future regulatory framework for 
this $2 trillion market sector, but did propose a substantive anti-fraud 
Rule at the end of 2006.153
pesky “accredited investor” thresholds.  See Goldman Plays Down Tracker Challenge 
To Hedge Funds, HEDGEWEEK.COM, Dec. 8, 2006, available at 
http://www.hedgeweek.com/articles/detail.jsp?content_id =42044 (last visited Jan. 31, 
2007).  Goldman-Sachs has developed a securities product that seeks to mimic hedge 
fund performance, that is readily available to overseas retail investors: 
Despite announcing the launch of a tracker product that seeks to replicate the returns 
of hedge fund strategies at the cost to the investor of an index product, Goldman 
Sachs is playing down suggestions that the product could eat into the market for funds 
of hedge funds by delivering similar performance at a much lower price. 
The Absolute Return Tracker uses hedge fund investment data delivered by a third-
party provider with a one-month lag to determine the aggregate positions of hedge 
funds in a basket of asset classes and to replicate their net exposure to equities, 
commodities, fixed income, credit and volatility through derivatives and other 
investments.  The ART index is already available to retail investors in Italy through a 
tie-up with a bank there and it is likely to be rolled out in other markets in the new 
year. 
Id.  See De Kwiatkowski, supra note 118 (discussing the De Kwiatkowski court’s 
development of the “special circumstances” doctrine in the context of a “dependent” 
client and the duties owed to that client by a broker). 
 152. See, e.g., Roddy Boyd, We Will Follow the Money: SEC, N.Y. POST, Nov. 14, 
2006, available at http://www.nypost.com/seven/11142006/business/we_will_follow_ 
the_money__sec_business_roddy_boyd.htm (last visited Dec. 5, 2006). 
 153. S.E.C. Delays Weighing Hedge Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2006, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/02/business/02hedge.html?_r=1&dlbk&oref=slogin 
(last visited Dec. 5, 2006).  The SEC has apparently adopted a more circumspect 
approach to rule promulgation following the results of Goldstein: 
The Securities and Exchange Commission on Friday dropped consideration of two 
hedge fund measures from its agenda for a Monday meeting, saying it wanted more 
time to review their language. 
One measure dealt with the minimum net worth that an investor must have to be 
allowed to invest in hedge funds.  In September, the S.E.C. said it was preparing a 
measure that would raise the minimum, known as the accredited investor standard, 
amid concern that too many investors of limited means are putting money in hedge 
funds. 
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The other measure involves tightening the antifraud statute dealing with hedge 
funds—lightly policed capital pools popular with the rich that have doubled their 
assets under management to $1.3 trillion in the last five years.  Both measures 
emerged after a court in June struck down an agency regulation that required most 
hedge fund advisers to register with the S.E.C.  The court said the S.E.C. overstepped 
its bounds in adopting the rule. 
An S.E.C. spokesman said the agency wanted “another week to make sure the 
technical language of the antifraud provision appropriately addresses the court’s 
decision.”  The S.E.C. has scheduled another public meeting for Dec. 13, when the 
hedge fund measures could come up. 
Id.; see Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles; 
Accredited Investors in Certain Private Investment Vehicles (Proposed Rule - comment 
period ended Mar. 9, 2007), 17 CFR §§ 230 and 275 (Dec. 27, 2006, SEC Release No. 
33-8766; IA-2576; File No. S7-25-06), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/ 
2006/33-8766.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2007); see comment letter from Phillip Goldstein 
to SEC, Mar. 3, 2007, available at http://sec.gov/comments/s7-25-06/pgoldstein 
8435.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2007) (criticizing the anti-fraud provisions of the 
Proposed Rule as “unnecessary” and characterizing the proposed increase in the 
financial minimums for the definition of “accredited investor” as a “massive increase in 
the minimum wealth an individual would need before that person could invest in a 
hedge fund”).  Mr. Goldstein also contended the Proposed Rule is “fatally flawed” 
because it does not expressly include private equity funds within its ambit, and that “if 
investor protection is the sole objective of the proposed rule (as it should be) then 
excluding venture capital funds unquestionably renders the rule arbitrary and 
capricious.”  Id.  Mr. Goldstein noted, however, that “we do not intend to challenge the 
rule, because . . . we do not expect it to have a material effect on our business.”  Id.  Mr. 
Goldstein also proposed a “blanket exemption” for any otherwise unqualified investor 
who submits certain suggested waiver language.  Id.  See also Thomas John Holton, 
Ephraim Lemberger and Michael Mavrides (Bingham-McCutchen, LLP), United 
States: SEC Issues Proposed Rules Affecting Hedge Funds And Other Pooled 
Investment Vehicles, 18 Jan. 2007, available at http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp? 
article_id=45566&lk=1 (last visited Jan. 21, 2007).  The authors, Bingham-McCutchen 
securities lawyers, noted certain details of the SEC’s proposal of a new anti-fraud rule 
in late 2006: 
On December 27, 2006, the Securities and Exchange Commission published two sets 
of proposed new rules. Many pooled investment vehicles, including hedge funds, 
venture capital funds, private equity funds, listed closed-end funds, and mutual funds, 
will be affected by one or both sets of rule . . . .  Proposed Rule 206(4)-8 under the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, as amended (the “Advisers Act”), would prohibit 
any investment adviser, whether or not registered, to a pooled investment vehicle from 
making false or misleading statements to, or otherwise defrauding, investors or 
prospective investors in the pooled investment vehicle . . . .  Specifically, the proposed 
rule would make it a fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative act, practice or course of 
business for any investment adviser to a pooled investment vehicle to make any 
untrue statement of a material fact to any investor or prospective investor in a pooled 
investment vehicle or omit a material fact necessary to make statements made to such 
investors, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.  
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The U.S. Federal Reserve, SEC, and IMF have all recognized the 
reality that hedge fund trading activity often improves financial market 
pricing efficiency and, in many instances, serves to increase liquidity.154  
However, hedge funds are such an enormous component of the U.S. 
commodities, futures and securities markets that the related trading 
activities invariably affect counter-parties; overall macro (and micro) 
market conditions; and a variety of other market participants, sometimes 
with destructive (and illegal) results.  Consequently, “[p]rosecutors 
[have] said it’s impossible to fight the rampant Wild West mentality 
among the hedge fund crowd unless new laws are enacted to tighten the 
industry’s loose ways and wide loopholes.”155  While the SEC adopted 
an arguably flawed approach when promulgating the so-called “Hedge 
Fund Rule,” there can be little debate that a multi-trillion dollar market 
sector warrants some measure of regulatory oversight.  Of course, the 
“devil is in the details,”156 and the pressing questions now are not if the 
In addition, the proposed rule would prohibit any act or practice which defrauds 
investors or prospective investors, regardless of whether such act or practice involves 
statements. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
 154. Ubide, supra note 28; see also IMF’s United States: 2006 Article IV 
Consultation—Staff Report; Staff Statement; and Public Information Notice on the 
Executive Board Decision, July 2006, IMF Country Report No. 06/297, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2006/cr06279.pdf (last visited Dec. 2, 2006) 
(The increased activity of hedge funds had enhanced price discovery and liquidity in 
many of the new markets.  However, they agreed with the mission that some markets 
had yet to be fully tested in a less benign financial environment).  IMF Staff Report at 
11; see also CNBC interview of former Goldman Sachs executive and current U.S. 
Treasury Secretary Henry “Hank” Pauslon, Dec. 8, 2006, Paulson: Hedge Funds 
‘Positive’ But Need to Be Monitored, CNBC.COM, Dec. 8, 2006, available at 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/16109844 (last visited Dec. 8, 2006).  Sec. Paulson stated that: 
By and large, hedge funds (and derivatives) have been positive for the capital markets, 
they have made them more efficient, more liquid, and it’s been very helpful in 
dispersing risk, and I think that may be one of the reasons we haven’t had a financial 
shock in the last eight years.  But again, it’s very important that we look very carefully 
at the nature of the market today. 
Id. 
 155. See Tharp, supra note 135 (“Witnesses at a Senate panel took turns yesterday 
bashing the expanding reach of hedge funds, which now control a third of Wall Street’s 
trading action and wield more than $1.3 trillion of other peoples’ money - mostly cash 
from well-to-do individuals and big pension funds trying to keep retirement checks 
flowing.”) (emphasis added). 
 156. RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF POPULAR PROVERBS AND SAYINGS (1st ed. 
1996) shows this phrase as a variation of “God is in the details - Whatever one does 
should be done thoroughly; details are important.”  The saying is generally attributed to 
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SEC will regain some measure of regulatory oversight, but rather when 
and how. 
Congress took an initial step subsequent the Goldstein decision, but 
no new legislation resulted from the proposal.  The House of 
Representatives Finance Committee Chairman for the 110th Congress, 
Representative Barney Frank (Mass.), and three House co-sponsors,157 
introduced a Bill on the heels of the D.C. Circuit Court’s Goldstein 
opinion158 during the twilight of the 109th Congress.  Although short on 
details, it was potentially profound in its post-Goldstein regulatory 
impact.  The two-page Bill (H.R. 5712) titled, “The Securities and 
Exchange Commission Authority Restoration Act of 2006,” sought “[t]o 
amend the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to authorize the 
Commission to require the registration of hedge fund advisers under that 
Act.”159  If Congress had enacted H.R. 5712, the method of counting 
Gustave Flaubert (1821-80), who is often quoted as saying, “Le bon Dieu est dans le 
detail” (“God is in the details”); see BARTLETT’S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS (16th ed.).  
Other attributions include Michelangelo, the architect Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, and 
the art historian Aby Warburg.  “The Devil is in the details” is a variant of the proverb, 
referring to a catch hidden in the details.  “Governing is in the details” and “The truth, if 
it exists, is in the details” are recent variants.  Listed as an anonymous saying in the 
16th edition of Bartlett’s “Familiar Quotations.”  Id.
 157. Rep. Michael Capuano (D-MA), Rep. Charles Gonzalez (D-TX), Rep. Paul 
Kanjorski (D-PA) were co-sponsors of The Securities and Exchange Commission 
Authority Restoration Act of 2006, H.R. 5712, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006) [hereinafter 
H.R. 5712]. 
 158. H.R. 5712 was introduced on June 29, 2006, six days after the Goldstein 
opinion was released. 
 159. See The Securities and Exchange Commission Authority Restoration Act of 
2006, H.R. 5712, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006).  Representative Frank’s proposed bill 
would have restored the SEC authority vacated by the Goldstein court: 
SEC. 2. AUTHORITY TO LIMIT EXEMPTION. 
Section 203 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (15 U.S.C. [§] 80b-3) is amended 
by adding at the end the following new subsection: 
(l) AUTHORITY TO LIMIT EXEMPTION. — (1) AUTHORITY.—The 
Commission may, by rule or regulation, limit the availability of the exemption 
provided by subsection (b)(3), and require the registration under this section, of an 
investment adviser by requiring that certain shareholders, partners, and beneficial 
owners of, or investors in, clients of the adviser shall also be counted as clients 
themselves for purposes of such subsection, as the Commission determines necessary 
in the public interest or for the protection of investors.  (emphasis added). 
(2) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—The treatment of a shareholder, partner, 
beneficial owner, or investor as a client for purposes of registration under this section 
shall not affect, and shall not be affected by, the treatment of such persons not as 
clients for purposes of section 206 or any other section of this title. 
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“clients” would have reverted to the method employed within the so-
called “Hedge Fund Rule” and reversed the effect of the D.C. Circuit 
Court’s Goldstein decision.  Three weeks after the bill’s introduction, 
H.R. 5712 was referred to the House Subcommittee on Capital Markets, 
Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises, where it eventually 
“died in committee.”160  One month after the bill’s introduction, the 
circuit court issued its formal Goldstein mandate, and the SEC opted to 
not appeal the matter to the U.S. Supreme Court.161
There was a trickle of investment adviser “de-registrations” after 
the Rule was formally vacated, but the trend slowed dramatically, with 
just ten percent of all affected investment advisers electing to remove 
their registration as of January 2007.162  Among the investment advisers 
Id. 
 160. See H.R. 5712 status tracking, available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress 
/bill.xpd?bill=h109-5712 (last visited Mar. 26, 2007) (“This bill is in the first stage of 
the legislative process where the bill is considered in committee and may undergo 
significant changes in markup sessions.”); Banking chairman wary of hedge fund 
registration, INVESTMENT NEWS, Feb. 6, 2007, available at 
http://www.investmentnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070206/FREE/7020503
0/-1/INRegulatoryAlert03 (last visited Feb. 15, 2007).  The article points out that: 
At a press conference held in early December [2006], Sen. Christopher Dodd, D-
Conn., said that although he’s concerned about pension plan money that’s invested in 
hedge funds, he does not see “rushing back” into legislation that would give the 
Securities and Exchange Commission authority to require hedge funds to register with 
the agency.  A bill [H.R. 5712] introduced last year with that goal died in committee. 
Id. 
 161. See Statement of Chairman Cox Concerning the Decision of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals in Phillip Goldstein et al. v. SEC (Aug. 7, 2006), available at 
http://sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-135.htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2006); see also 
Amanda Cantrell, SEC Faces Hedge Fund Deadline: The SEC has until Aug. 7 to 
decide what to do in the wake of a court’s decision to overturn its hedge fund rule, 
CNNMONEY.COM, Aug. 4, 2006, available at http://money.cnn.com/2006/08/04/ 
markets/hedge_returns/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2007). 
 162. More Hedge Funds Deregister After Ruling, AFX UK Focus (U.K.), September 
27, 2006.  Slightly more than one hundred advisers rescinded their Form ADV 
registrations (out of a total exceeding 2,000): 
From June 23 [2006], through Sept. 21 [2006], 116 advisers indicating they have 
hedge funds as clients have withdrawn their registrations, said John Heine, a 
spokesman for the SEC.  Of those, about 76 indicated that they withdrew due to the 
court decision overturning the regulatory push, he said.  “Others withdrew for various 
other reasons, including going out of business, [Heine] said.”  And according to John 
Heine, since the appeals court decision through Sept. 21, 2006, 34 hedge fund 
advisers have registered with the SEC.  As of September 21, 2006, there were a total 
of 2,468 Investment Advisers who had indicated they have hedge funds as “clients” 
registered with the SEC, according to the SEC’s Heine. 
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who elected to not withdraw registration was CastleRock Management, 
a Manhattan-based “buy and hold” bottom-up selection strategy long 
equities hedge fund.163  During a March 20, 2007 guest lecture at 
Fordham University School of Law, CastleRock president Paul Tanico 
advised Fordham students to, “[r]un the business down the middle of the 
road and remember the lines. . . . .  The SEC and IRS are not to be 
messed with, . . . don’t run your business over the line, [or] shortcut for 
something.”164  Mr. Tanico also commented about the SEC registration 
regime and his firm’s reasoning for not withdrawing its registration 
Form ADV: 
I don’t like regulation, and think rich people ought to be able to lose 
money in hedge funds without registration—we are registered 
though and we always run our business down the middle of the road 
so it wasn’t a big deal and we didn’t de-register. . . .  I think that a lot 
of funds that are going down to the small investor where people have 
no business [investing] in these funds, and with a lot of amateurs are 
running it who lose money, so I think that aspect of . . . safeguarding 
smaller investors with the rules was right. . . .  I would hate to see 
Congress interfere because of a few “bad apples” . . . so I come out 
Id.; see also Hannah Glover, Most Hedge Funds Remain Registered: Prepare for SEC 
Exams; Staying Squeaky Clean, MONEY MGMT. EXEC., Jan. 15, 2007, 2007 WLNR 
871608, available at http://www.financial-planning.com/pubs/fpi/20070119101.html 
(last visited Jan. 19, 2007).  Only a slim minority of investment advisers elected to 
withdraw their registration Forms ADV: 
After the fight for the right to remain unregistered, only about 10% of those hedge 
fund advisors that signed up with the Securities and Exchange Commission before last 
year’s Feb. 1 [2006] deadline have opted to withdraw, according to data from the 
federal regulator.  The remaining 2,200 or so are readying for examinations. 
The reason, industry watchers suggest, is that what was once characterized as the 
“Wild West” of investment management has learned that registration has its 
advantages, not the least of which is credibility, especially with deep-pocketed 
institutional investors. 
Id. 
 163. CastleRock Management (IARD/CRD No. 132155) Investment Adviser 
registration Form ADV was timely filed in February 2005, available at 
http://www.adviserinfo.sec.gov/IAPD/Content/Search/iapd_OrgSearch.aspx (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2007). 
 164. Videotape of Mr. Tanico’s remarks on file with Fordham University School of 
Law’s Center for Corporate Securities and Financial Law, Prof. Ann R. Rakoff, 
Executive Director, 140 W. 62nd St., Room 443, New York, NY 10023; telephone 
(212) 636-7985; e-mail: corporatecenter@law.fordham.edu. 
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on the side of some rules are okay but don’t overdo it.165
Just two months after the Goldstein decision, the Greenwich-based 
and, ironically named,166 Amaranth Advisors collapsed under the weight 
of its own heavily leveraged and highly speculative natural gas futures 
positions.167  The market barely blinked, and JPMorgan Chase & Co. 
(Amaranth’s prime broker) and T. Boone Pickens were among those 
who quickly swooped in to scoop up discounted chunks of Amaranth’s 
decimated natural gas futures portfolio.  Incidentally, just a few days 
later, Mr. Pickens’s son was the subject of a Wall Street Journal article 
reporting his alleged involvement in a “pump and dump” stock scheme 
that employed “fax blasts” to induce investors to purchase touted 
securities.168  Meanwhile, Representative Frank, who retreated from his 
 165. Id.  Mr. Tanico also noted during a March 20, 2007 “Mergers and 
Acquisitions” guest lecture at Fordham University School of Law: 
I think at the higher end if the minimum requirements are a million dollars, and in the 
larger fund that we have is five million dollars in investable assets without your home, 
you’re a big boy, and you know what, if you lose your money [ ] you shouldn’t be 
looking to the government to help you. 
I think there should be a higher standard to that [for pension funds], and our being 
registered makes us more comfortable for pension funds, so I think there’s an element 
that I can kind of buy into. 
 166. am·a·ranth / Pronunciation [am-uh-ranth] – noun; 1.  an imaginary, undying 
flower.  http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/amaranth (last visited, Dec. 5, 2006). 
 167. Gretchen Morgenson and Jenny Anderson, A Hedge Fund’s Loss Rattles 
Nerves, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/19/ 
business/19hedge.html (last visited Dec 5, 2006). 
 168. Geoffrey Smith and Matthew Leising, Citadel, Funds Bet $3 Billion After 
Amaranth Falls (Update2), BLOOMBERG, Oct. 16, 2006, available at 
http://www.canadianhedgewatch.com/content/news/general/?id=1022 (last visited Dec. 
6, 2006); see Kara Scannell, Stock-Scam Case: a Pickens, a Fax, Bad Luck, Oct. 30, 
2006, WALL ST. J. 
[T. Boone Pickens’s] son Michael O’Brien Pickens has taken a different path to try to 
emulate that success, federal authorities alleged yesterday.  The younger Mr. Pickens, 
who is 51 years old, and another man were arrested and charged with securities fraud 
for allegedly manipulating thinly traded stocks through a ‘pump and dump’ scheme 
orchestrated via blast faxes—including some sent to the federal agencies that nabbed 
them. 
Id. (emphasis added); see Dallas billionaire’s son admits to securities fraud, DALLAS 
BUS. J., Oct. 31, 2006, available at http://dallas.bizjournals.com/dallas/stories/ 
2006/10/30/daily14.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2006); SEC Charges Stock Promoters in 
Phony Fax Scam, SEC Litigation Release No. 19305, July 18, 2005, SEC v. Joshua 
Yafa, Michael O. Pickens et al., Civil Action No. 05 CV 6480 (SDNY LAK), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr19305.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2006); 
FBI Press Release, Hot Stock Tip, Anyone? The Case of the Phony Faxes, Nov. 20, 
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rather aggressive pro-regulatory stance subsequent to the November 
2006 election, called for House Committee hearings on hedge funds, and 
stated that he was “without any predisposition of saying more regulation 
is needed.”169
Charles Grassely, an Iowa Republican, has not been nearly as 
ambivalent as some of his congressional peers with regard to his hedge 
fund policy-making approach.  The former Chairman, and now ranking 
minority Senate Finance Committee member, unsuccessfully sought to 
attach a hedge fund amendment to a recent Homeland Security bill, 
because, as Mr. Grassley contended, various terrorist groups may have 
undetected hedge fund links and possibly launder money through 
securities trading activities of the secretive pooled investments.170  
Senator Grassley also asserted while introducing a new bill that all 
hedge funds managing more than $50 million in assets and serving more 
than 15 investors should be compelled to register with the Commission 
as Investment Advisers, a policy proposition generally consistent with 
the now “arbitrary” rule that was vacated by the Goldstein court.171
It certainly remains debatable whether the vacated Rule could have 
possibly prevented (or even helped to predict) Brian Hunter, a 32 year-
old trader formerly employed by Amaranth, from adopting a “bet the 
farm” trading strategy in volatile natural gas futures during the summer 
2006, available at http://www.fbi.gov/page2/nov06/stock_scam112006.htm (last visited 
Dec. 30, 2006). 
 169. Frank Wants Hearings on Hedge Fund Industry, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 5, 2006, 
http://www.boston.com/business/globe/articles/2006/12/05/airline_to_delay_taking_del
ivery_of_32_small_jets/ (last visited Dec. 5, 2006). 
 170. Marilyn Geewax, Powerful hedge funds present a dilemma for Congress, 
regulators, SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Mar. 17, 2007, available at http://www.sltrib.com/ 
business/ci_5461412 (last visited Mar. 18, 2007) (“The secretive way that hedge funds 
operate might not be an issue for the super-rich who first invested in hedge funds, but 
today the average Joe has a stake,” [Sen.] Grassley said in a statement.  “Right now, a 
hedge fund isn’t required to report even basic information about who runs the fund.”). 
 171. Id.  Iowa Senator Charles Grassley’s “rebuffed” amendment would also have 
required hedge funds to make their records available for routine regulatory inspections, 
much like the “arbitrary” rule at issue (and vacated) in Goldstein.  Sen. Grassley 
introduced a terse, two page bill aiming to amend Section 203(b)(3) of the Investment 
Advisors Act of 1940 titled, “The Hedge Fund Registration Act of 2007” which 
effectively seeks to replace the term “client” with “investor” in order reverse the effect 
of the U.S. Court of Appeals ruling in Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006), 
and expressly authorize the SEC to compel hedge fund advisor registration.  Copy of 
Grassley bill available at http://grassley.senate.gov/releases/2007/05152007.pdf (last 
visited May 21, 2007). 
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of 2006.172  Not surprisingly, many hedge fund managers seem to 
agree.173  Similarly, exchange-listed and registered issuers such as 
Adelphia, Enron, Refco, and WorldCom all collapsed after defrauding 
thousands of investors of millions of dollars,174 all while filing periodic 
reports, and under the regulatory auspices of major exchanges and the 
SEC.175
The split-Commission’s regulatory aim embodied laudable goals 
and intentions, but was largely undermined by the parsing of its prior 
use of a single word.  A unanimous three-judge circuit court opinion 
vacated the Rule;176 most notably, it was apparently because of the 
SEC’s inconsistent interpretation177 of the term “client” for the purposes 
 172. Ann Davis, How Giant Bets on Natural Gas Sank Brash Hedge-Fund Trader - 
Up in Summer, Brian Hunter Lost $5 Billion in a Week As Market Turned on Him, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 19, 2006, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article_print/ 
SB115861715980366723.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2007).  Incidentally, Mr. Hunter, 
Amaranth’s former natural gas futures trader, began actively seeking investors in late 
March of 2007 for a new Calgary-based commodities hedge fund named “Solengo 
Capital.”  See Alistair Barr, Amaranth investors suggest dropping legal claims, 
MARKETWATCH.COM, Mar. 23, 2007, available at http://www.marketwatch.com/ 
news/story/some-amaranth-investors-suggest-dropping/story.aspx?guid=%7B3E5061B 
B-EB8A-4184-A456-8E59C5A5249B%7D (last visited Mar. 25, 2007).  See also 
Amaranth Advisors L.L.C., Comment Letter to SEC Re: File No. S7-30-04—
Registration under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Sept. 15, 2004 
(“Contrary to media stereotypes of hedge fund managers, Amaranth does not operate in 
the shadows’ outside of regulatory scrutiny.”). 
 173. Melanie Waddell, Will the SEC Appeal? Dealing with hedge fund registration’s 
legal challenge,  INVESTMENT ADVISOR, Aug. 2006, available at 
http://www.investmentadvisor.com/article.php?topic=Alternative+Investments&article
=6648 (last visited Dec. 5, 2006).  Some hedge fund managers are skeptical that a 
registration requirement will prevent securities fraud: 
Like other hedge fund advisors, Hedges says he’s “unconvinced that registration is 
going to prevent fraud” in the $1.1 trillion hedge fund industry.  “A lot of time, 
money, investigation, and energy has been spent under the auspices of registration 
being used to prevent fraud, and I don’t think that’s a sufficient deterrent,” he says.  “I 
think the SEC is already heavily burdened as an agency in terms of enforcement.” 
Id. 
 174. See Goldstein Complaint, supra note 15, at ¶ 36. 
 175. Id. 
 176. See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 177. See Speech, supra note 35.  Commissioner Atkins has noted that the Rule’s 
flaws invited scrutiny: 
It is no wonder that the rule, with its ad hoc and internally inconsistent definition of 
‘client,’ attracted a legal challenge.  The majority, in adopting the registration 
mandate, abandoned the common-sense notion that the client is the person for whom 
2007 PRUNING THE HEDGE: WHO IS A “CLIENT” 965 
 AND WHOM DOES AN ADVISER ADVISE? 
 
of the Rule, which in the court’s view, fell beyond “the bounds of 
reasonableness.”178  The Goldstein court vacated what was deemed to be 
an “arbitrary” Rule and, while the SEC still possesses the data produced 
from the now defunct registration regime, it was stripped of its ability to 
perform hedge fund books and records inspections—perhaps the most 
potent of the Rule’s investigative measures.  Nonetheless, the glimmer 
of a post-Goldstein regulatory dawn is on the horizon for those who 
favor heightened regulatory oversight, or at least desire some semblance 
of hedge fund transparency. 
The sharp focus by the media, market commentators, legislators, 
investors, and regulators on issues related to hedge funds in the 
Goldstein aftermath might eventually lead to a shift in U.S. hedge fund 
regulation (and possibly within certain foreign jurisdictions).  Such 
reform will apparently not come without staunch resistance.  Recent 
remarks from a presidential panel chaired by U.S. Treasury Secretary 
Henry Paulson, asserted “the current system of hedge-fund regulation is 
‘working well’ and market discipline remains the best way to protect 
investors and guard against risks to the financial system.”179  Former 
the advice is tailored.  The final rule redefined ‘client’ solely for advisors to hedge 
funds and then only to determine their eligibility to rely on the fifteen client 
exemption from registration.  The new definition demands that advisors look through 
their hedge funds and count investors as clients. 
Regardless of how the Court decides the case, the challenge has already served to 
remind us of the danger of undergoing regulatory contortions to achieve a 
questionable objective. 
Id. 
 178. See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 881 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Aid Ass’n 
for Lutherans v. U.S. Postal Serv., 321 F.3d 1166, 74, 77-78 (D.C.Cir.2003)). 
An agency construction of a statute cannot survive judicial review if a contested 
regulation reflects an action that exceeds the agency’s authority.  It does not matter 
whether the unlawful action arises because the disputed regulation defies the plain 
language of a statute or because the agency’s construction is utterly unreasonable and 
thus impermissible. 
Id.; cf. FCC v. Nat’l Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 808 n.29 (1978) 
(citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 201-02 (1947)). 
 179. Judith Burns, Rep. Frank: No Decision Yet On Hedge Fund Regulation, DOW 
JONES NEWSWIRES, Mar. 13, 2007, available at http://www.nasdaq.com/aspxcontent/ 
NewsStory.aspx?cpath=20070313%5CACQDJON200703131503DOWJONESDJONLI
NE000587.htm& (last visited Mar. 26, 2007).  Opposition to a renewed hedge fund 
registration framework was pronounced during recent congressional committee 
testimony: 
Industry officials and academics who testified before the House panel mostly opposed 
requiring hedge fund managers to register with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, subjecting them to routine SEC inspections and annual audits.  An SEC 
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U.S Treasury Secretary John Snow, now the chairman of hedge fund 
adviser Cerebus Capital Management, which recently acquired the 
scandal-plagued Austrian bank BAWAG, has also urged for “lighter” 
regulation and contended that the “real policing of these pools of capital 
are the investors,” and that any additional regulatory efforts would 
create “a real risk of moral hazard that implies, ‘Don’t worry.  Now the 
government is watching over you and there aren’t any problems.’”180
The proposed “hands off” approach to today’s hedge funds might 
produce similar results as a similar laissez faire philosophy did for 
securities traders during the “roaring twenties,” such as notorious market 
manipulator Jesse Livermore, who considered average investors to be 
easy prey for poaching in a free-wheeling “survival of the fittest” stock 
market.181  Corruption and market manipulation may be the end result 
rule to require mandatory registration of hedge fund managers was rejected last year 
by a federal appeals court and several of those testifying to the House panel Tuesday 
[March 13, 2007] said it isn’t needed and would give investors a false sense of 
security.  About half of hedge fund managers now choose to register voluntarily with 
the SEC. 
Id.; see David Scheer & Jenny Strasburg, U.S. Says Hedge Fund Regulation Is 
‘Working Well’ (Update4), Feb. 22, 2007 BLOOMBERG.COM, available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aPwrzZyVCVx8 (last 
visited  April 24, 2007)  Secretary Paulson noted his philosophy about market 
regulation does not include guarding against hedge funds from “having problems”:
The panel, led by Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and including his counterparts at 
the U.S. Federal Reserve, the Securities and Exchange Commission and the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, said in guidelines released today that the 
responsibility of maintaining discipline falls on hedge-fund managers, investors, 
creditors, trading partners and market regulators. 
“Those who would believe that the role of regulators is to guard against any losses or 
somehow prevent losses or to prevent a hedge fund from having problems, they have 
a different philosophy about regulation than I do,” Paulson said in an interview. 
The report by the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, which Paulson 
called the ‘unified perspective’ of U.S. regulators, makes no recommendations for 
new government regulation. 
Id. 
 180. Kevin Carmichael, Funds: In new role, Snow urges ‘lighter’ regulatory touch, 
INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE, Nov. 21, 2006, available at http://www.iht.com/bin/print.php? 
id=3349226 (last visited Mar. 26, 2007).   See also Haig Simonian, Sale does not close 
Bawag scandal, FINANCIAL TIMES, Dec. 15, 2006, available at http://search.ft.com/ 
ftArticle?queryText=BAWAG&y=0&aje=true&x=0&id=061215007121 (last visited 
April 6, 2007). 
 181. See, e.g., Richard Smitten, JESSE LIVERMORE: WORLD’S GREATEST STOCK 
TRADER, Wiley & Sons (2001); see Edwin Lefèvre, REMINISCENCES OF A STOCK 
OPERATOR, George H. Doran & Co. (1923), republished by Wiley & Sons (1994). 
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from a “less is more” regulatory approach, just as it did with “junk 
bonds” in the Eighties, and corporate accounting scandals in the 
Nineties.  For example, New York and Washington prosecutors charged 
thirteen suspects with insider trading offenses in a scheme that 
implicated major brokerage firm employees as “central figures in an 
insider-trading ring [that] illustrate[s] why regulators and lawmakers are 
suspicious of Wall Street’s relationship with hedge funds.”182  Those 
recent arrests seem to suggest that perhaps market regulators have 
placed newfound focus on prime brokers that facilitate hedge fund 
trading activities after the Goldstein holding hindered the SEC’s ability 
to investigate hedge funds directly. 
Certainly not everyone is enamored with the notion of unrestrained 
free-market forces as the “answer” to viral-like growth of hedge funds in 
the domestic capital markets, and the massive influence they now wield.  
Connecticut Attorney General Richard Blumenthal characterized the 
presidential panel’s laissez faire proposal as little more than “vague 
recommendations lack[ing] substance and specifics, making them 
 182. David Scheer, Insider-Trading Ring Bust May Fuel Hedge-Fund Concern 
(Update3), BLOOMBERG.COM, Mar. 2, 2007, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aTDBCdaTQ774 (last visited Mar. 18, 2007).  Insider 
trading violations continue to be a priority of securities regulators, and some pundits 
consider those violations to justify hedge fund registration:
“Incidents like this strengthen the hands of those who are urging greater scrutiny of 
hedge-fund activities and their sources of information,” said David Becker, a former 
SEC general counsel now in private practice at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton 
LLP in Washington 
Legislators such as Senator Arlen Specter, the Pennsylvania Republican, want market 
watchdogs to take action amid mounting evidence of rampant insider trading.  At least 
two studies show that stocks and derivatives regularly rise ahead of takeovers, and in 
the past week trading of options to buy shares of TXU Corp. and Hyperion Solutions 
Corp. surged in advance of announcements that they agreed to be acquired. 
Hedge funds are private pools of capital that allow managers to participate 
substantially in gains on the money invested.  That pay structure creates an incentive 
for employees to trade in non- public information.  Hedge-fund managers also are 
under pressure to boost returns that since 2000 have averaged half the industry’s gains 
in the 1990s. 
The temptation to cheat extends to the securities firms, which collect $10 billion a 
year in fees for providing prime-brokerage services to hedge funds.  “The larger the 
pot of gold the more likely that you’ll entice someone into stealing,” said William 
Portanova, a criminal-defense attorney and former federal prosecutor based in 
Sacramento.  “Good people convince themselves over a cocktail that it’s a victimless 
crime and that they’re merely collecting a few crumbs from the feast that no one will 
ever miss.” 
Id. 
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unenforceable, [and which] amount to a buyer-beware strategy that has 
proven ineffective.”183  Various members of Congress also appear less 
than receptive to any sort of free market solution, among those is Texas 
Democrat Al Green, who characterized the current state of hedge funds 
as “the commingling of sophisticated and unsophisticated capital.”184  At 
least one prominent hedge fund manager, Kenneth Brody, co-founder of 
Taconic Capital Advisors (which did not hesitate to register with the 
SEC while the Rule was in effect), has become an advocate of sorts for 
increased regulation due to the risk exposure pension funds presently 
face with billions currently invested in hedge funds, and has urged for a 
more flexible principles-based outcome, rather than rule-driven 
regulations.185  Lawmakers apparently remain uncertain about how to 
even define the clandestine, unregulated pools of funds with any degree 
of precision, which is perhaps the first step on the path towards 
 183. See Scheer & Strasburg, supra note 179. 
 184. See Jenny Anderson, House Panel Ponders the Growth and Risk of Hedge 
Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/ 
03/14/business/14hedge.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2007); see also Wall Street Pros Say 
Hedge Funds Don’t Need New Regulations, CNBC.COM, Mar. 13, 2007, available at 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/17595287 (last visited Mar. 18, 2007).  The article points out 
that: 
[M]embers of the committee, chaired by Rep. Barney Frank, D-Mass., expressed 
concern that average investors could be hurt without further oversight.   
We are now concerned about the inadvertent consequence of a systemic-like event 
which causes pensioners who have no idea their managers invested in a derivatives 
currency arbitrage to lose money as a result of a Russian currency crisis,’ said Rep. 
Richard Baker, (R) Louisiana. 
Id. 
 185. See Anderson, supra note 184; see also David M. Katz, Lawmakers: Hedge-
Fund Risk Hits Pensions, CFO.COM, Mar. 13, 2007, available at 
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/8844660 (last visited Mar. 26, 2007) (Mr. Brody is also 
chairman of the investment committee of the University of Maryland).  Hedge fund 
manager Kenneth Brody has become an advocate for a registration regime, and suggests 
that such a framework would have a prophylactic effect: 
[Kenneth] Brody’s answer was, like [Iowa Republican Senator Charles] Grassley’s, to 
require mandatory registration of hedge-fund advisers by the SEC.  What registration 
provides, the hedge-fund manager said, “is self-discipline and self-policing, because 
[registration] comes with the threat of an SEC investigation.” 
Like many other hedge funds, however, Taconic Capital Advisors registers voluntarily 
with the SEC.  Brody pointed out that a number of the requirements of registration— 
including the designation of a chief compliance officer; the presence of written 
policies and procedures; a code of ethics; and retention of books and records— 
“promote investor protection.” 
Id. 
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meaningful regulatory reform.186
It seems that any pragmatic prediction would likely find some sort 
of negotiated outcome to the hedge fund regulatory question to be 
probable, especially when considering the sheer power that trillions of 
dollars in capital can wield when matched against Capitol Hill 
policymakers.  As such, some sort of blended result appears likely where 
higher tier hedge funds might voluntarily file disclosures with something 
resembling a quasi-regulatory body, such as a voluntary membership 
SRO-managed association.  The quid-pro-quo for such disclosures 
might be a sort of “best practices” benchmark, or “seal of approval.”187  
The SEC, NYSE, NASD, CTFC, and other similar enforcement bodies, 
could then focus regulatory resources on the prime brokerages that call 
these funds clients, such as the early 2007 “trading sweep” conducted by 
the SEC of at least ten Wall Street firms during an investigation of 
suspected trading improprieties from September 2006.188  According to 
 186. See Geewax, supra note 170. 
 187. The National Football League Player’s Association (“NFLPA”) implemented a 
“seal of approval” program for hedge fund advisers seeking union approval to manage 
the investments of current and former NFL players.  Nonetheless, at least one union-
approved hedge fund manager allegedly “stole over $100 million in investors money.”  
See Jailed fund manager fined $20m for fraud, Feb. 13, 2007, FIN. TIMES, available at 
http://news.moneycentral.msn.com/provider/providerarticle.aspx?Feed=FT&Date=2007
0213&ID=6473196 (last visited Mar. 26, 2007); see also Complaint, Atwater v. 
NFLPA, Civ. Case No. 106-cv-01510-JEC (N. Dist. Ga. June 23, 2006); Feb. 12, 2007 
SEC Litigation Release No. 19999, re: SEC v. Kirk S. Wright; Int’l Mgmt. Assocs., 
LLC et al., available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/lr19999.htm (last 
visited March 18, 2007); Bishop: NFL, union ‘failed’ players hurt in scam, available at 
http://www.nfl.com/news/story/9534836 (last visited Oct. 18, 2006); see also Fraud 
lawsuit against NFL, union to proceed, NFL.com, Mar. 30, 2007, available at 
http://www.nfl.com/news/story/10097842 (last visited April 1, 2007) (stating that U.S. 
District Judge Julie E. Carnes (Georgia) denied defendants’ motion to dismiss on March 
29, 2007 and noting that the league and players’ union owe duties to the players under 
state law and nothing in the record suggested the NFL-NFLPA collective bargaining 
agreement pre-empts that duty owed).  Perhaps this decision will later extend to other 
employer-employee contexts, such as where pension funds are imprudently placed with 
rogue hedge fund managers resulting in investment losses or fraud and might give rise 
to potential claims by pension fund beneficiaries. 
 188. See Scheer, supra note 182.  The SEC conducted a “trading sweep” in early 
2007 of at least ten Wall Street firms during an investigation of suspected trading-
improprieties allegedly occurring in September 2006: 
Earlier this year, the SEC asked at least 10 Wall Street firms to turn over stock-trading 
records for the last two weeks of September, seeking to determine whether they 
leaked details about big stock trades to favored clients.  The government said 
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newly appointed Nasdaq vice-chairman, Michael G. Oxley, it would 
require a ten-fold increase in the SEC budget to directly regulate hedge 
funds.189
V. CONCLUSION 
A steady pace adopted by the SEC post-Goldstein may ultimately 
produce innovative results as momentum continues to build in favor of 
hedge fund reform.  The NYSE and NASD already refer suspicious 
buying and selling data to the SEC, and reportedly share hedge fund 
market monitoring data with the SEC, according to NYSE Market 
Surveillance Chief, Robert Marchman.190  During a Fall 2006 lecture at 
Fordham University School of Law, head of NASD enforcement, James 
Shorris, speculated about the eventual possibility of an SRO-like hedge 
yesterday that it broke one of the biggest insider-trading cases since the 1980s. 
According to the SEC, which brought a civil suit against 14 defendants, the scheme 
stretched over five years, included hundreds of tips and produced more than $15 
million in illegal profits. 
Id. 
 189. Maria Bartiromo, Michael Oxley’s Next Act, BUSINESS WEEK, April 9, 2007, 
available at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/07_15/b4029107.htm? 
chan=top+news_top+news+index (last visited April 24, 2007).  Former U.S. 
Representative Michael G. Oxley (Ohio), now non-executive vice-chairman of Nasdaq, 
considers direct SEC regulation of hedge funds to be “unrealistic”: 
I think private equity plays an enormous role in our economy that is somewhat 
misunderstood. Whether they’re hedge funds or private equity concerns, they do a real 
service. In many cases, private equity firms take a company private, fix it up, dress it 
up, and put it back on the market for an IPO. We have enormous capital there that is 
almost uniquely American. If we were to regulate, say, the hedge funds, you would 
have to increase the budget of the SEC something like tenfold. It’s rather unrealistic. 
Id. 
 190. Jesse Westbrook & David Scheer, SEC Plans Database to Stem Illegal Hedge-
Fund Trading (Update3), BLOOMBERG, Dec. 5, 2006, available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=a41rbUuQZCZ4&refer=ho
me (last visited Jan. 2, 2007).  U.S. regulatory bodies and SROs are increasingly sharing 
market surveillance data:
The New York Stock Exchange and the NASD, which refer data about suspicious 
buying and selling to the SEC, are coordinating efforts to share information about 
hedge funds, Robert Marchman, head of market surveillance for the NYSE, said in an 
interview. 
The agencies plan to build out a database with information detailing relationships 
between hedge funds and other ‘financial business-related entities’ in an effort to 
uncover illegal trading, [Machman] said. 
Id. (quoting an anonymous Senior U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Official). 
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fund registration regime managed by the NASD.191  During Senate 
Committee testimony, SEC Enforcement Chief Linda Thomsen alluded 
to a new SEC database surveillance system that will more closely 
monitor hedge fund trading activities, but revealed scant details about 
the new technologies currently in development.192  One can only hope 
 191. Remarks by NASD Executive Vice President and head of enforcement, James 
Shorris, Fordham University School of Law’s “Securities Enforcement” guest lecture, 
Nov. 1, 2006 (notes from lecture on file with aurhor). 
 192. See Westbrook & Scheer, supra note 190.  SEC officials have hinted that new 
market surveillance technology is currently under development: 
“The SEC presently does not have an electronic system to aggregate referrals based 
on the identities of the specific traders involved,” SEC Enforcement Director Linda 
Thomsen said before the Senate Judiciary Committee today.  “We anticipate 
implementing a new case tracking system by mid-2007.” 
Illegal trading by hedge funds “remains a substantial concern” to the SEC as the $1.3 
trillion industry’s influence over financial markets grows, Thomsen said. Hedge 
funds, which are loosely regulated private pools of capital, manage about 5 percent of 
U.S. assets and account for about 30 percent of U.S. equity trading volume. 
Today’s [December 4, 2006] hearing is the third convened by Senator Arlen Specter, 
the Judiciary Committee’s chairman, in six months to examine oversight of insider 
trading. The Pennsylvania Republican circulated draft legislation aimed at halting 
illegal buying and selling of stocks that would require hedge funds accepting money 
from pension funds to submit to random inspections by the SEC. 
His measure would also force hedge funds, which allow managers to participate 
substantially in the gains of money invested, to set up ethics codes and compliance 
programs and allow the Justice Department to give private citizens rewards for 
helping in prosecutions of insider trading cases. 
“Light regulation, secrecy, unregulated record keeping and limited compliance 
programs of hedge funds increase the difficulty of detecting and proving insider 
trading,” according to Specter’s legislation, which hasn’t been introduced. 
Id.  However, Kit Addleman, associate director of the Fort Worth, Texas regional SEC 
enforcement office hinted in late March 2007 that new technologies were already being 
employed as part of the ongoing “Operation Spamalot” investigation that has already 
nabbed a number of suspects in alleged stock tout scams.  See Brendan M. Case & 
Michael Grabell, Exclusive: SEC investigating possible ‘pump-and-dump’ scam, 
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 25, 2007, available at http://www.dallasnews.com/ 
sharedcontent/dws/news/localnews/stories/032507dnmetsecinvestigate.40477d8.html 
(last visited Mar. 27, 2007).  The SEC has been tight-lipped about details regarding new 
market surveillance technology, but published reports suggest that regulators are 
already using new technology to detect securities fraud schemes: 
The SEC won’t discuss particulars of its investigation, but such classic ‘pump-and-
dump’ scams are a high priority for the agency because e-mail spam and instant online 
stock trading make small investors more vulnerable than ever. 
“With the Internet technology, there is so much more ability to get to the retail 
investors through their computers,” said Kit Addleman, associate director of 
enforcement for the SEC’s regional office in Fort Worth. 
Id. 
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that appropriate and meaningful market reform will take effect prior to 
any catastrophic market break. 
Considering that the NASD maintained the SEC’s IARD 
Investment Adviser Registration Database system,193 as well as its own 
internal “BrokerCheck” database194 covering every registered 
representative and broker-dealer member conducting securities business 
in the U.S., it certainly seems that such an advent is well within the 
realm of possibilities.  An NASD hedge fund adviser registration regime 
is also an entirely logical regulatory evolution in light of SEC Chairman 
Cox’s strong support195 for the combined NASD and NYSE 
enforcement functions196 (both of which have historically provided 
 193. The NASD is no stranger to enforcement issues involving hedge funds, and 
activities such as market timing.  See, e.g., NASD PRESS RELEASE, NASD Orders 
Diversified Investors Securities to Pay Over $2.2 Million for Facilitating Market 
Timing - Firm Also Fined for Supervisory Breaches, Email Failures, Feb. 14, 2006, 
available at http://www.nasd.com/PressRoom/NewsReleases/2006NewsReleases/ 
NASDW_015974 (last visited Dec. 5, 2006); see Halah Touryalai, Another One Bites 
the Dust: Broker Fined Record Amount for Market-Timing Scheme, 
REGISTEREDREP.COM, http://registeredrep.com/news/record-markettime-fine/ (last 
visited Dec. 5, 2006); see Hedge fund manager gets record $2.25 million NASD fine, 
REUTERS, Oct. 25, 2006, available at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/15413254/ (last visited 
Oct. 30, 2006). 
 194. NASD BrokerCheck, http://pdpi4.nasdr.com/pdpi/Req_Type_Frame.asp (last 
visited Dec. 5, 2006). 
 195. Dan Caterinicchia, NYSE, NASD to Meld Regulatory Operations, FORBES, Nov. 
28, 2006, available at http://www.forbes.com/home/feeds/ap/2006/11/28/ 
ap3210306.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2006).  SEC Chairman Cox has been among those 
who strongly support the combined regulatory functions of the NYSE and NASD: 
Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Christopher Cox, who has been a 
vocal advocate of a single markets regulator, touted the increased enforcement 
efficiencies that should come from the new system. 
“When it comes to America’s competitiveness, we are advantaged when our 
regulatory function is more efficient,” said Cox, calling the proposed merger “a 
milestone.” 
But Cox cautioned that the global regulatory landscape continues to change and will 
necessitate future revisions to keep the U.S. competitive. 
“The world in which we live isn’t sitting still. This appropriate adaptation to changes 
all around us is going to be under constant review as the world markets continue to 
integrate and change,” he added. 
Id. 
 196. S.J. Caplan, There’s a New Sheriff Coming to Town, THE MOTLEY FOOL, Nov. 
29, 2006, available at http://www.fool.com/News/mft/2006/mft06112916.htm (last 
visited Mar. 26, 2007).  The combined NYSE-NASD enforcement divisions will have 
regulatory oversight of all U.S. broker-dealers: 
[T]he two organizations announced the signing of a letter of intent to consolidate their 
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cooperative enforcement assistance to the SEC),197 suggesting that 
significant evolution, and perhaps newfound regulatory efficiencies, 
might eventually result from the united SRO enforcement entities, 
among which could include a public-private partnership that provides 
some reliable and trustworthy measure of hedge fund transparency and 
accountability. 
House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney Frank has 
continued to modify his post-Goldstein hedge fund policy stance.  While 
he has not yet committed to any specific conclusions, he did publicly 
contemplate during a March 2007 Committee hearing “whether to 
restrict hedge funds from accepting pension fund clients or bar pension 
funds from hedge fund investments.”198  According to Chairman Frank, 
a regulation requiring hedge funds to retain certain records “primarily 
for the purposes of law enforcement,” is another option under House 
Committee consideration.199  Self-imposed hedge fund guidelines, 
including a voluntary international “code of conduct,” to foster 
transparency, and in lieu of enhanced regulation, is yet another option 
gaining support in some surprising circles.200
regulatory operations into a new unnamed self-regulatory organization (SRO).  
Expected to begin operations in the second quarter of 2007, the new entity will serve 
as the private sector regulator for all broker-dealers doing business with the public in 
this country. 
Id. 
 197. See Westbrook & Scheer, supra note 190 (The SEC announced plans to “have a 
database in place by next year that will help it crack down on hedge-fund insider 
trading.”).  The combined NYSE-NASD regulatory divisions are also developing new 
market surveillance technologies: 
The New York Stock Exchange and the NASD, which refer data about suspicious 
buying and selling to the SEC, are coordinating efforts to share information about 
hedge funds, Robert Marchman, head of market surveillance for the NYSE, said in an 
interview. 
The agencies plan to build out a database with information detailing relationships 
between hedge funds and other ‘financial business-related entities’ in an effort to 
uncover illegal trading, he said. 
Id. 
 198. See Burns, supra note 179. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Jenny Strasburg & Michael McKee, Steinbrueck Says Hedge Funds Should 
Police Themselves (Update4), Mar. 16, 2007, BLOOMBERG.COM, available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601100&sid=aHr7iq.3kmug&refer=ger
many (last visited March 18, 2007).  In a surprising development, the German official 
who referred to hedge funds as “locusts” now believes the sector should be self-
regulating: 
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Perhaps Phillip Goldstein was more prescient than he realized when 
he likened the SEC to a turtle,201 and the Commission, like Aesop’s 
fabled tortoise,202 may just prevail in the long race towards hedge fund 
regulation, though its victory may take a form substantially different 
from the vacated Rule.  And perhaps it will prove to be a fitting legacy 
for the “Bulldog,” who was recently bestowed with a “Braveheart 
Award” by the New York Times for his challenge of the now “arbitrary” 
Rule, and who has wasted little time in mounting his next challenge to 
further squelch required hedge fund disclosures.203  The “Bulldog” 
German Finance Minister Peer Steinbrueck said hedge-fund managers ought to create 
a voluntary international ‘code of conduct’ to ward off more government regulation 
by the Group of Seven nations. 
Steinbrueck, whose Social Democratic Party derided private-equity firms and hedge 
funds as ‘locusts’ two years ago, favors a push toward voluntary transparency by the 
private investment pools.  Leaders of other G-7 members, including the U.S. and 
U.K., said in recent months they prefer market-based solutions, such as better policing 
by brokerages and pension-fund managers, to protect investors and insulate the 
markets from fund collapses. 
Steinbrueck said he has met regularly with hedge-fund managers from the U.S. and 
abroad since he took office in 2005.  He declined to name which fund managers 
attended the meetings but said some expressed support for self-monitoring among 
funds. 
“There are some hedge funds that are not behaving properly,” he said, declining to 
elaborate.  “They must have the deep interest themselves to tackle these problems.” 
A system of self-imposed guidelines would take several months to create, and 
government leaders aren’t ready to describe what information needs to be disclosed or 
to whom, Steinbrueck said. 
“This is the very beginning of this discussion,” he said.  Steinbrueck said that hedge-
fund managers should provide more transparency to financial firms that lend them 
money, service their margin accounts and clear their trades.  The prime brokerages are 
insufficiently informed to have accurate ‘risk profiles’ of their hedge-fund clients, he 
said. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 201. See Goldstein January 2004 SEC Letter, supra note 80. 
 202. OLIVIA & ROBERT TEMPLE, AESOP: THE COMPLETE FABLES (Penguin Classics 
1998). 
 203. Jenny Anderson, The Private Lives of Hedge Funds, N.Y. TIMES, at C1, Dec. 
29, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 22713061.  The New York Times bestowed this 
tongue-in-cheek award to Mr. Goldstein for his successful challenge of the Rule: 
THE BRAVEHEART AWARD—Phillip Goldstein was an unknown hedge fund 
manager at an unremarkable hedge fund, Bulldog Investors, until he sued the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, contending that the agency did not have the 
authority to regulate hedge funds, and won.  As a result, the court vacated the 
controversial registration requirement and left the S.E.C. with little authority over 
hedge funds. 
The S.E.C. is now contemplating a rule that will prohibit all but 1.3 percent of 
Americans from investing in hedge funds.  It also rewrote a fraud provision that at 
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wrapped himself in the Fifth Amendment and articulated an incomplete, 
albeit novel, trade secrets theory in a pending battle with the SEC that 
challenges the enforceability of Section 13 portfolio disclosure 
requirements, and is championing the First Amendment in matters 
against the state of Massachusetts and its Secretary of the 
Commonwealth, William Galvin (who Mr. Goldstein has attacked in the 
press as a “bully” and a “pompous ass”), regarding the alleged public 
solicitation of prospective hedge fund investors via the Internet in yet 
another Goldstein hedge fund skirmish.204
After all the Goldstein dust settles, it seems certain that the 
“Bulldog” and his seemingly indomitable regulatory windmill-tilting 
will be forever recognized for having sparked substantive discourse that 
could eventually shape the future of the domestic capital markets in 
which Americans invest, perhaps for generations to come.  Eventual 
policy reform may decide whether hedge funds will be permitted to 
operate under a persistent cloak of secrecy, or whether the bedrock 
securities principle of disclosure will apply to this enormous pool of 
capital that affects the U.S. markets, economy, and citizens, for better or 
for worse.  The “Bulldog” will invariably be viewed by history as a 
genuine market maverick and the incendiary catalyst for much of that 
reformist debate, and will always be intertwined with the outcome, in 
whatever form it eventually takes.  And it all began with a single word. 
 
least allows it to go after, well, fraud. 
Id.  See also Pekarek, supra note 78. 
 204. Pekarek, supra note 78. 
